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ABSTRACT
This research investigates population-level behavioral dynamics, how they affect the
emergence of self-enforcing conventions, and how they can aid in the design of mecha-
nisms to better achieve policy goals. It seeks to identify why long-run behavior approaches
equilibrium in some environments, and fails to do so in others. This question is important
because equilibrium is frequently employed to make policy recommendations, so it is
necessary to identify when it provides reliable predictions. Further, many strategic envi-
ronments only reach equilibrium in the long run, so modeling the short run process from
which long run equilibria eventually emerge can help answer important policy-relevant
questions. To answer these questions this research experimentally investigates behavioral
dynamics in continuous-time strategic environments. We find that adaptive models pro-
vide remarkably powerful tools for identifying which strategic environments exhibit con-
vergence to equilibrium and for characterizing disequilibrium dynamics in non-convergent
strategic environments.
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1. INTRODUCTION: COORDINATION AND CONVERGENCE
1.1 Motivation
Classical game theory describes Nash equilibrium as the outcome of introspective rea-
soning prior to play by perfectly rational agents.1 In contrast, evolutionary game theory
explains Nash equilibrium as a self enforcing convention that emerges as the long run
outcome of dynamic interaction among large populations of boundedly rational agents.2
While evolutionary models are frequently invoked as equilibrium selection tools, their
ability to explicitly characterize disequilibrium dynamics is frequently overlooked. In ad-
dition to the identification and classification of equilibria, evolutionary game theory also
provides theoretical models that explicitly describe the dynamic process from which Nash
equilibrium emerges.3 These dynamic evolutionary models provide a theoretical frame-
work for addressing aspects of disequilibrium behavior which are inaccessible to classical
models that exclusively identify and classify equilibria.
To test theoretical predictions from these evolutionary models, this chapter experi-
mentally investigates dynamic behavior in a class of attacker defender population games
that exhibit identical equilibrium predictions but starkly different evolutionary predictions.
In the control treatment, subjects play a conventional attacker-defender population game
with two classes of equally valuable targets. Here attackers prefer to attack the class of
targets that is least likely to be defended, but defenders prefer to defend the class of targets
that is most likely to be attacked. Evolutionary dynamics predict global convergence to
equilibrium in these conventional attacker defender games.
1A thorough discussion of the epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium in classical game theory can be
found in Aumann and Brandenburger [5].
2This interpretation of Nash equilibrium as the long run outcome of an adaptive adjustment process is
not a recent innovation. Notably, it was employed by Cournot [6] and Nash [7].
3See Sandholm [8] for more on the use of dynamic models in evolutionary game theory.
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The coordination treatment adds weak intrapopulation coordination incentives, giving
attackers an incentive to coordinate their attacks on a class of targets and giving defend-
ers an incentive to coordinate their defenses on a class of targets. In these coordinated
attacker-defender games, evolutionary dynamics predict divergence from equilibrium and
the emergence of stable limit cycles. Under both experimental treatments, subjects ad-
justed their strategy continuously and earned continuous flow payoffs. This continuous-
time experimental design is consistent with the continuous-time structure of dynamic evo-
lutionary models and allows for the observation of long term behavioral phenomena that
may be difficult to observe in a discrete-time setting.4
The attacker-defender games investigated by this chapter provide a remarkably
powerful test of evolutionary game theory because they cleanly separate evolutionary
predictions from those of other models.5 A variety of solution concepts yield identical
predictions under both treatments, including Nash equilibrium, logit quantal response
equilibrum [10], level-k [11, 12], cognitive hierarchy models [13], and the time average of
the Shaply polygon (TASP) [14]. The limitation of such models is that they exclusively
identify and classify strategy profiles satisfying their respective behavioral criteria. In
contrast, evolutionary models explicitly describe the dynamic process from which such
strategy profiles emerge.
Unlike the aforementioned models, evolutionary dynamics predict markedly different
behavior under each treatment. Specifically, evolutionary models predict convergence to
equilibrium under the control treatment, but predict the emergence of divergent limit cycles
under the coordination treatment. This clear division between theoretical predictions from
evolutionary models and those from other behavioral models allows this particular class
of attacker-defender games to serve as an efficient testing structure for evolutionary game
4See [9] for an example of such phenomena.
5See section 1.2.4 for more details regarding these theoretical predictions.
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theory.
Consistent with theoretical predictions from evolutionary models, the observed subject
behavior was tightly clustered around Nash equilibrium under the control treatment
but was widely dispersed from Nash equilibrium under the coordination treatment. In
opposition to the Nash equilibrium predictions, these results indicate that coordination
incentives can lead to autocorrelated attacks in attacker-defender population games, thus
making attacks more predictable.
This chapter tests three widely employed evolutionary models,6: the best response
dynamic Gilboa and Matsui [15], the Smith dynamic Smith [16] and the logit dynamic
Fudenberg and Levine [17], each of which is derived from a distinct set of underlying
behavioral assumptions. Both the best response dynamic and the Smith dynamic maintain
the conventional assumption of sign-preservation, namely that agents exclusively switch
from lower performing strategies to higher performing strategies.7 In contrast, the logit
dynamic is not sign-preserving as it describes agents who sometimes switch from higher
performing strategies to lower performing strategies.8
Under the coordination treatment, sign-preserving dynamics predict that behavioral
limit cycles will approach the boundary of the state space.9 In contrast, dynamics
that violate sign-preservation predict that behavioral limit cycles will remain strictly in
the interior of the state space.10 This distinction between the theoretical predictions
from different classes of evolutionary models provides a powerful test for the widely
maintained assumption of sign-preservation. In contrast to theoretical predictions from
sign-preserving dynamics, the observed cycles remained strictly in the interior of the state
6See [8] for more on these models.
7See section 1.2.3 for more details regarding the definition of sign-preservation.
8The logit dynamic does satisfy the weaker assumption of sign-correlation, namely that agents are more
likely to switch from lower performing strategies to higher performing strategies.
9Here the state space denotes the set of all possible mixed strategy profiles. See section 1.2.1 for more
details.
10See section 1.2.4 for a graphical depiction of these theoretical predictions.
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space under the coordination treatment. This violation of sign-preservation suggests that
the wider class of sign-correlated dynamics deserves further attention and may provide
a superior characterization of human behavior over the more conventional class of sign-
preserving dynamics.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Subsection 1.1.1 discusses the
related literature. Section 1.2 describes the theoretical framework of dynamic evolutionary
models and their predictions in attacker-defender games. Section 1.3 provides a thorough
description of our experimental design and the procedures employed. Section 1.4 indicates
the hypothesis that are tested in this experiment. Section 1.5 presents the main results and
section 1.6 concludes.
1.1.1 Related Literature
Unlike previous experimental investigations of evolutionary game theory, this chapter
tests the predictions of continuous sign-preserving evolutionary dynamics against those of
discontinuous dynamics, sign-correlated dynamics, and Nash equilibrium. This chapter
obtains a clean test of these theoretical predictions by experimentally investigating
attacker-defender population games that yield distinct evolutionary predictions but yield
the same predictions from a variety of a variety of other widely employed solution
concepts. Specifically, this particular class of games yields identical predictions from Nash
equilibrium, logit quantal response equilibrum [10], level-k [11, 12], cognitive hierarchy
models [13], and TASP [14]. In contrast, evolutionary dynamics yield strikingly different
predictions for different games in this class. Further, different types of evolutionary models
yield different predictions for the same game. This division between the theoretical
predictions of different evolutionary models provides a powerful test of their respective
underlying behavioral assumptions.
This chapter contributes to a growing body of experimental research testing evolution-
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ary game theory in laboratory experiments. Early experimental investigation of evolu-
tionary game theory focused on testing evolutionary models of equilibrium selection. In
particular, [18] observed strong convergence to inefficent pareto dominated equilibria in
minimum effort games with multiple equilibria. They suggested that the emergence of
these particular equilibria was driven by the presence of strategic uncertainty rather than
previously traditional equilibrium refinement methods. [19] later formalized these obser-
vations through the use of evolutionary stability criteria.
[20] were among the first to employ continuous-time laboratory procedures in testing
evolutionary models. They considered Hawk-Dove population games with with two
asymmetric Nash equilibria and one symmetric Nash equilibrium. In accordance with
evolutionary selection criteria, they found that subjects converge to an asymmetric
equilibrium under two population matching protocols, but converge to a symmetric
equilibrium under one population matching protocols. Their experiment provided
empirical evidence for the ability of evolutionary models to help solve the equilibrium
selection problem in games with multiple Nash equilibria. In contrast, this chapter
investigates the ability of explicitly dynamic evolutionary models to predict dynamic
disequilibrium behavior in games with unique Nash equilibria.
[21] implemented laboratory procedures where subjects adjusted mixed strategies
continuously over time. They observed cyclical behavior in three rock-chapter-scissors
population games: one with a stable equilibrium and two with unstable equilibrium.
In these games, they tested point predictions from the time average of the Shaply
polygon (TASP) [14] against point predictions from Nash equilibrium. In contrast, this
chapter tests predictions from sign-preserving evolutionary dynamics against those of
Nash equilibrium, discontinuous dynamics, and sign-correlated dynamics.
[22] investigated continuous-time population games with non-linear payoff functions
and continuous strategy spaces. They test evolutionary models of imitative behavior
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against evolutionary models of optimization behavior in all-pay auction population games
exhibiting unique mixed-strategy Nash equilibria. In contrast, this chapter tests predictions
from sign-preserving evolutionary dynamics against those of discontinuous dynamics and
sign-correlated dynamics.
1.2 Theory
In this chapter we test theoretical predictions from dynamic evolutionary models in
attacker-defender population games. Population games provide a theoretical framework
for the analysis of repeated strategic interaction between large numbers of agents. In
evolutionary game theory, population games are employed to model a wide variety of
strategic environments including market competition [23], highway traffic [16], and tax
compliance [24].
1.2.1 Population Games
A population game is played by a society composed of one or more populations
p ∈ P = {1, . . . , p}. Each population p contains a continuum of agents who choose
pure strategies from the set Sp = {1, . . . , np}. The proportion of population p that
employs the pure strategy i is denoted by xpi ∈ [0, 1]. Accordingly, a population state
xp = (x1
p, . . . , xpnp ) indicates the proportion of population p that employs each pure 
strategy i ∈ Sp. Further, a social state x = (x1, . . . , xp) describes the state of each 
population p ∈ P . The payoff to an agent in population p who employs pure strategy
i ∈ Sp is given by the payoff function pipi (x).
A social state x is said to be a Nash equilibrium if no agent in any population can
increase her payoff by unilaterally adjusting her strategy. More formally, a social state
x is a Nash equilibrium if, for every population p ∈ P and every pair of pure strategies
i, j ∈ Sp, xpi > 0 implies pipi (x) ≥ pipj (x). A Nash equilibrium is said to be evolutionarily
stable if, whenever any sufficiently small proportion of agents deviates to some alternate
6
social state, then under the resulting social state, agents who stay at the Nash equilibrium
do better, on average, then agents who deviated to the alternate social state. More formally,
A Nash equilibrium x is said to be evolutionarily stable if there exists some ε > 0 such that
for any alternate social state y 6= x and any proportion α ∈ (0, ε) we have x·pi(z) > y·pi(z)
where z = αy + (1 − α)x. This evolutionary stability criterion was originally developed
for games played by a monomorphic population of agents by [25] and was extended to the
case of multiple polymorphic populations by [26].
1.2.2 Attacker-Defender Population Games
This chapter considers attacker-defender population games11 played by a population of
attackers A and a population of defenders D. Each defender chooses to defend one of her
two possible targets SD = {1, 2}. Each attacker is randomly matched with a defender and
chooses to attack one of her two possible targets SA = {1, 2}. Attackers prefer to attack
the target that is least likely to be defended and defenders prefer to defend the targets that
is most likely to be attacked. The expected payoff to a defender is proportional to the
share of her chosen target in the attacker population. Conversely, the expected payoff to
an attacker is proportional to the share of her unchosen strategy in the defender population.
If both populations are evenly divided between target 1 and target 2, then both targets yield
equal payoffs and no agent has an incentive to switch targets, so this social state is a Nash
equilibrium. Formally, the payoffs functions in this standard attacker-defender game are
given by
piA1 (x) = Mx
D
2 pi
A
2 (x) = Mx
D
1
piD1 (x) = Mx
A
1 pi
D
2 (x) = Mx
A
2
(1.1)
This chapter also considered attacker-defender population games with weak intrapop-
ulation coordination invectives. In such games, attackers have an incentive to coordinate
11See [27] and [28] for more on attacker-defender games.
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their attacks on a target and defenders have an incentive to coordinate their defense on a
target. Formally, the payoff functions in these coordinated attacker-defender games are
given by
piA1 (x) = Mx
D
2 + Cx
A
1 pi
A
2 (x) = Mx
D
1 + Cx
A
2
piD1 (x) = Mx
A
1 + Cx
D
1 pi
D
2 (x) = Mx
A
2 + Cx
D
2
(1.2)
Here the parameter M denotes the strength of the attacker-defender incentives while
the parameter C denotes the strength of the coordination incentives. So long as the
coordination incentives remain weaker than the attacker-defender incentives (M > C >
0), this game still has a unique Nash equilibrium social state under which both populations
are evenly divided between their two pure strategies. Hence the equilibrium predictions
in this coordinated attacker-defender game remain unchanged from those of the standard
attacker-defender game.
1.2.3 Evolutionary Dynamics
This paper considers theoretical predictions from dynamic evolutionary models de-
scribing the diachronic process of behavioral adjustment as a system of differential equa-
tions. This method of describing evolutionary dynamics in population games via revision
protocols was originally introduced by Bjornerstedtt and Weibull [29] and has since been
employed by numerous researchers including Sandholm [30] and Bulò and Bomze [31].
A revision protocol ρpij (x) indicates the rate at which agents in population p switch from
strategy i to strategy j as a function of the social state x. The induced evolutionary dy-
namics are described by by the non-linear differential equation:
x˙pi =
∑
j∈Sp
xpjρ
p
ji (x)− xpi
∑
j∈Sp
ρpij (x) (1.3)
The first summation in this expression describes the inflow of agents into strategy i
from other strategies, while the second summation describes the outflow of agents from
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strategy i onto other strategies. The difference between these two summations yields the
net rate of change x˙pi in the proportion of population p employing the pure strategy i.
An evolutionary dynamic is said to be sign-preserving when agents exclusively switch
from lower performing strategies to higher performing strategies. More formally, an
evolutionary dynamic is said to be is said to be sign-preserving if pipj (x) > pi
p
i (x) ⇐⇒
ρpij (x) > 0. In contrast, an evolutionary dynamic is said to be sign-correlated if agents
switch from lower performing strategies to higher performing strategies more rapidly
than they switch from higher performing strategies to lower performing strategies. More
formally, an evolutionary dynamic is said to be sign-correlated if pipj (x) > pi
p
i (x) =⇒
ρpij (x) > ρ
p
ji (x).
Conventional solution concepts such as Nash equilibrium [7], logit quantal response
equilibrum [10], level-k [11, 12], cognitive hierarchy models [13], and TASP [14]
exclusively identify and classify the social states that satisfy their respective criteria. In
contrast, evolutionary dynamics explicitly describe the dynamic process of behavioral
adjustment from which such social states may emerge. Since evolutionary dynamics
explicitly model the process from which equilibria emerge, these models are uniquely
positioned to characterize behavior out of equilibrium. The remainder of this section
will describe three widely employed evolutionary dynamics, identify their underlying
behavioral assumptions, and highlight the key differences between their theoretical
predictions for the coordinated attacker-defender game.
In their analysis of the social stability of Nash equilibrium, Gilboa and Matsui [15]
consider an evolutionary dynamic under which agents myopically switch to their best
response under the current social state. This best response dynamic is also closely related
to the discrete-time fictitious play dynamic discussed by Brown [32]. Formally, the
conditional switch rate from the pure strategy i to the pure strategy j in population p
9
under the best response dynamic is given by
ρpij(x) =

1 if j ∈ argmax
k∈Sp
pipk(x)
0 otherwise
(1.4)
Since the best response dynamic assumes that agents myopically switch to their current
best response, any fixed point of the best response dynamic must have every agent
simultaneously best responding to the strategies selected by other agents. Hence every
Nash equilibrium is a fixed point of the best response dynamic and every fixed point of the
best response dynamic is a Nash equilibrium.
Figure 1.1a illustrates the conditional switch rate under the best response dynamic in
games where each agent has two pure strategies. The vertical axis indicates the conditional
switch rate from the pure strategy i to the pure strategy j and the horizontal axis indicates
the difference in payoffs between agents in population p who employ strategy j and those
who employ strategy i. Note the abrupt change in the conditional switch rate at the point
where both strategies yield equal payoffs. This jump illustrates the discontinuity in the
conditional switch rate under the best response dynamic.
In his analysis of disequilibrium highway traffic congestion dynamics, Smith [16]
considers an evolutionary dynamic under which agents switch from lower performing
strategies to higher performing strategies at a rate proportional to the difference in payoffs.
Hence the conditional switch rate from the pure strategy i to the pure strategy j in
population p is given by
ρpij (x) = max
{
0, pipj (x)− pipi (x)
}
, (1.5)
The Smith dynamic falls into the category of pairwise comparison dynamics as the
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conditional switch rate from strategy i to strategy j in population p depends exclusively
on the pairwise comparison pipj (x) − pipi (x). Like the best response dynamic, the Smith
dynamic is sign-preserving because the conditional switch rate ρpij (x) positive if and
only if pipj (x) > pi
p
i (x). Sandholm [30] proves that the fixed points of every sign-
preserving pairwise comparison dynamic exactly coincide with the Nash equilibria of the
corresponding population game. Hence every fixed point of the Smith dynamic is a Nash
equilibrium and every Nash equilibrium is a fixed point of the Smith dynamic.
Figure 1.1b illustrates the conditional switch rate under the Smith dynamic in games
with two pure strategies for each population. The vertical axis indicates the conditional
switch rate from the pure strategy i to the pure strategy j and the horizontal axis indicates
the difference in payoffs between agents in population p who employ strategy j and those
who employ strategy i. Unlike the best response dynamic, conditional switch rate is
continuous in payoffs under the Smith dynamic, so small changes in payoffs produce small
changes in the conditional switch rate. In contrast, a minute change in payoffs can produce
a sudden and drastic change conditional switch rates under the best response dynamic.
Fudenberg and Levine [17] describe describe an evolutionary dynamic under which
agents switch towards their perceived best response under a noisy perturbation of their
payoffs. This logit dynamic is closely related the logit quantal response equilibrium
described by McKelvey and Palfrey [10]. Under the logit dynamic, agents are more likely
to switch to strategies that yield higher payoffs. Formally, the conditional switch rate from
the pure strategy i to the pure strategy j in population p under the logit dynamic is given
by
ρpij (x) =
exp(η−1pipj (x))∑
k∈Sp
exp(η−1pipk(x))
. (1.6)
Here η denotes the noise level in an agent’s perception of payoffs. As η becomes small,
agents perceive their payoffs more precisely, and the conditional switch rate approaches
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that of the best response dynamic. Conversely, as η becomes large, agents become
increasingly insensitive to payoff differences and the conditional switch rate approaches
uniformly random behavior.
Unlike the Smith dynamic and the best response dynamic, the logit dynamic is not
sign-preserving, but it is sign-correlated since agents are more likely to switch from lower
performing strategies to higher performing strategies. Consequently, some population
games have Nash equilibria that are not fixed points of the logit dynamic. Specifically, the
fixed points of the logit response dynamic correspond to the set of logit quantal response
equilibria, which do not always coincide with Nash equilibria.
Figure 1.1c illustrates the conditional switch rate under the logit dynamic in games
with two pure strategies for each population. The vertical axis indicates the conditional
switch rate from the pure strategy i to the pure strategy j and the horizontal axis indicates
the difference in payoffs between agents in population p who employ strategy j and those
who employ strategy i. Like the Smith dynamic, but unlike the best response dynamic, the
conditional switch rate is continuous in payoffs under the logit dynamic.
Each of the aforementioned evolutionary dynamics exhibit markedly different behav-
ioral assumptions, but each dynamic also shares some key assumptions with others. For
instance, both the logit dynamic and the Smith dynamic predict that the conditional switch
rate will be continuous in payoffs, so small changes in the payoffs will always result in
correspondingly small changes in conditional switch rate under these models. In con-
trast, the best response dynamic is discontinuous in payoffs, so small changes in payoffs
can produce disproportionately large changes in the conditional switch rate under the best
response dynamic.
Both the Smith dynamic and the best response dynamic are sign-preserving, meaning
that agents who follow these dynamics will exclusively switch from lower performing
strategies to higher performing strategies. Consequently, the fixed points of the Smith
12
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Figure 1.1: Conditional switch rates in populations with two pure strategies
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dynamic and the best response dynamic reliably coincide with Nash equilibria. In contrast, 
the logit dynamic is not sign-preserving but it is sign-correlated, meaning that agents who 
follow this dynamic are more likely to switch from lower performing strategies to higher 
performing strategies. Consequently, the fixed points of the logit dynamic frequently fail 
to coincide with Nash equilibrium.
1.2.4 Evolutionary Dynamics in Attacker-Defender Games
Figure 1.2a depicts the best response dynamics for both variations of the attacker 
defender game. Similarly, figure 1.2b depicts the Smith dynamics, and figure 1.2c depicts 
logit dynamics. The graph on the left side of each figure illustrates the theoretical 
predictions of each evolutionary dynamic under the standard attacker-defender game, and 
the graph on the right side of each figure illustrates the theoretical predictions under the 
coordinated attacker-defender game. The horizontal axis of each graph indicates the 
proportion of attackers that attack target 2 and the vertical axis of each graph indicates the 
proportion of defenders that defend target 2. Each solid line in these figures illustrates the 
predicted path of the social state starting from a different set of initial conditions.
Recall that defenders in these games have an incentive to defend the target that is most 
likely to be attacked, while attackers have an incentive to attack the target that is least 
likely to be defended. Consequently, dynamic evolutionary models consistently predict 
the presence of clockwise cycles in these games. However, in the conventional attacker-
defender game, dynamic evolutionary models predict that the social state will gradually 
spiral inwards towards equilibrium. Whereas, in the coordinated attacker-defender game, 
dynamic evolutionary models predict that the social state will converge to a stable limit 
cycle that indefinitely orbits the Nash equilibrium.
Different evolutionary models yield significantly d ifferent p redictions r egarding the 
shape of the limit cycles. As illustrated in figure 1.2a, the best response dynamic predicts
14
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Figure 1.2: Evolutionary dynamics in the attacker defender game. Theoretical predictions
for the standard attacker-defender game where M = 5 and C = 0 are shown on the
left. Theoretical predictions for the coordinated attacker-defender game where M = 2.6
and C = 2.4 are shown on the right. These parameters are selected to reflect those
implemented in the experimental treatments.
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that agents will exhibit sudden sharp reversals in behavior when the best response changes.
Accordingly, the best response dynamic predicts that the stable limit cycle orbiting the
Nash equilibrium in the coordinated attacker-defender game will take a rectangular shape.
In contrast, as illustrated in figures 1.2b and 1.2c, the Smith dynamic and the logit
dynamic predict that agents will exhibit smooth gradual changes in behavior as payoffs
change smoothly over time. Figure 1.2c depicts the predictions of the logit dynamic for
η = 0.08. As η becomes small, subjects become increasingly sensitive to small differences
in payoffs, so the predicted path of the social state becomes increasingly similar to that
of the best response dynamic, with increasingly sharp changes in switching behavior.
However, as η increases, agents become more noisy in their behavior and switching
behavior becomes less sensitive to relative payoff differences.
When the population of attackers is near equilibrium, the targets are nearly equally
to be attacked, so the coordination incentives can outweigh the defense incentives for
defenders. Conversely, when the population of defenders is near equilibrium, the targets
are nearly equally likely to be attacked, so the coordination incentives can outweigh
the attack incentives for attackers. Consequently, as illustrated in figures 1.2a and
1.2b the limit cycles predicted by sign-preserving dynamics in the coordinated attacker
defender game approach the boundary of the state space. In contrast, non-sign-preserving
dynamics predict that agents exhibit some noise in their behavior, sometimes switching
from higher performing strategies back to lower performing strategies. Thus, when any
population coordinates on a single target, noisy switching behavior pushes the population
state back towards a distribution of strategies in the interior of the population state
space. Consequently, as illustrated in figure 1.2c, the limit cycles predicted by non-sign-
preserving dynamics remain strictly in the interior of the state space.
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1.3 The Experiment
This experiment varies coordination incentives across two attacker-defender popula-
tion games. Both treatment exhibit identical equilibrium predictions, but dynamic evolu-
tionary models yield strikingly different predictions regarding the dynamic disequilibrium
behavior in each treatment.
1.3.1 Experimental Design
This study implements two experimental treatments: a control treatment and a
coordination treatment. In the control treatment, subjects played a conventional two-
population attacker defender game as described in section 1.2.2. Subjects in the defender
group earned $5.00 per minute times the proportion of attackers that they defended against.
Similarly, subjects in the attacker group earned $5.00 per minute times the proportion
of defenders that did not defend againt their attack.12 Accordingly, under the control
treatment, earnings per minute were determined by
piA1 (x) = $5.00x
D
2 pi
D
1 (x) = $5.00x
A
1
piA2 (x) = $5.00x
D
1 pi
D
2 (x) = $5.00x
A
2
(1.7)
where xgi denotes the proportion of group g employing the pure strategy i.
In the coordination treatment, each subject faced intrapopulation coordination incen-
tives in addition to the payoffs from the standard attacker-defender game. As discussed in
section 1.2.2, these coordination incentives do not effect the Nash equilibrium predictions,
but they do effect the disequilibrium dynamics predicted by evolutionary models. Here
defenders earned $2.60 per minute times the proportion of attackers that they successfully
defended against and attackers earned $2.60 per minute times the proportion of defenders
12Both [20] and [22] similarly employ mean-matching protocols and have their subjects earn payoffs
continuously over time. The use of mean-matching and continuous flow payoffs are a standard procedures
in the experimental literature investigating evolutionary game theory.
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who failed to defend against their attack. In addition, attackers earned $2.40 per minute
times the proportion of their fellow attackers that they coordinated with and defenders
earned $2.40 per minute times the proportion of their fellow defenders that they coordi-
nated with. Formally, in the coordination treatment, earnings per minute were determined
by
piA1 (x) = $2.60x
D
2 + $2.40x
A
1 pi
A
2 (x) = $2.60x
D
1 + $2.40x
A
2
piD1 (x) = $2.60x
A
1 + $2.40x
D
1 pi
D
2 (x) = $2.60x
A
2 + $2.40x
D
2
(1.8)
These parameters are selected to equalize the equilibrium expected payoff across
treatments, so that Nash equilibrium not only predicts identical behavior across both
treatments, but also identical payoffs across treatments. Further, these parameters equalize
the total strength of incentives across treatments, so that evolutionary dynamics predict
equal adjustment speeds in both treatments.
1.3.2 Experimental Procedures
Each experimental session was conducted with twenty subjects and lasted for about
thirty minutes. On average, each subject earned a total of $18.63, including a five dollar
show-up payment. We employ a between-subjects design, so each subject participated in
one and only one experimental session. Two sessions were conducted with each of the two
experimental treatments, for a total of four sessions with 80 distinct experimental subjects.
At the beginning of each session, subjects were randomly divided into two equally sized
population groups, so each group of attackers consisted of exactly 10 subjects and each
group of defenders consisted of exactly 10 subjects. Subjects stayed in the same population
group for the duration of a session. Each session consisted of eight identical periods
wherein subjects played an attacker-defender population game. Each period lasted for a
total of forty seconds. Each session lasted for about thirty minutes, including time to read
18
Figure 1.3: Experimental decision interface
the instructions.
Throughout each period, subjects could continuously adjust their probability of
employing each strategy.13 Figure 1.3 illustrates an example of the decision interface used
by subjects. The horizontal position of the green bar illustrates the probability of each
strategy currently being selected by the subject. When the green bar was all the way on the
left side of the graph, the subject employed the pure strategy A with certainty. Conversely,
when the green bar was all the way on the right side of the graph, the subject employed
the pure strategy B with certainty. When the green bar was in the interior of the graph,
13[21] similarly allow their subjects to adjust their mixed strategies continuously over time.
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the subject had a positive probability of employing each pure strategy. More precisely, the
subject’s probability of taking action A was proportional to the distance between the green
bar and the right side of the graph and the subject’s probability of taking action B was
proportional to the distance between the green bar and the left side of the graph.
The dotted black line in figure 1.3 illustrates the current expected earnings rate for
each feasible mixed strategy. The height of the dotted line at the left side of the graph
indicates the current payoff for the pure strategy A. Similarly, the height of the dotted line
at the right side of the graph shows the current payoff for the pure strategy B. During
each period subjects earned continuous flow payoffs. In figure 1.3, the height of the green
bar indicates the subject’s current earnings rate. In addition, the subject’s current earnings
rate and the subject’s current accumulated earnings are listed at the bottom of the decision
screen. At the end of each experimental session, subjects received their total accumulated
earnings plus a five dollar show up payment in cash.
1.4 Hypotheses
Both the control treatment and the coordination treatments have identical unique Nash
equilibria. However, as described in section 1.2.2, different evolutionary models yield
markedly different predictions regarding the disequilibrium dynamics of subjects in each
treatment group. In particular, evolutionary dynamics consistently predict that the social
state will exhibit global convergence to equilibrium under the control treatment, gradually
spiraling inwards towards the Nash equilibrium. In contrast, evolutionary dynamics
consistently predict that the social state will converge to a stable limit cycle that perpetually
orbits the Nash equilibrium under the coordination treatment.
Although a evolutionary models consistently predict non-convergent cyclical behavior
in the coordination treatment, different evolutionary models yield sharply different
predictions regarding the shape of these cycles. In particular, sign-preserving dynamics
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predict that limit cycles will approach the boundary of the state space, while non-sign-
preserving dynamics predict that limit cycles will remain strictly in the interior of the state
space. Further, continuous dynamics predict that subjects will exhibit small behavioral
changes in response to correspondingly small changes in payoffs, but best response
dynamics predict that subjects will exhibit drastic behavioral changes in response to small
changes in payoffs when their best response changes. This bifurcation between theoretical
predictions provides this paper with a uniquely powerful test for the underlying behavioral
assumptions of evolutionary models. See figure 1.2 for a graphical illustration of these
theoretical predictions.
Accordingly, behavioral deviations from equilibrium are predicted to be self-correcting
under the control treatment. Whereas, under the coordination treatment, small behavioral
deviations are predicted to produce sustained non-convergence and persistent cycling.
Under both treatments, evolutionary dynamics predict that the population state will exhibit
clockwise cyclical dynamics. From these theoretical predictions, the following hypotheses
are obtained:
H0. Nash Equilibrium: Subjects in both treatments exhibit identical behavior since
both treatments share an identical unique Nash equilibrium.
H2. Evolutionary Dynamics: Both treatments will exhibit clockwise cycles but the
social state will exhibit greater stability and lower deviation from equilibrium in the control
treatment than in the coordination treatment as predicted evolutionary dynamics.
H3. Continuous Dynamics: Subjects will exhibit small behavioral changes in re-
sponse to correspondingly small changes in payoffs as predicted by continuous evolution-
ary dynamics.
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H4. Sign-Preserving Dynamics: Subjects in the coordination treatment will exhibit
behavioral limit cycles that approach the boundary of the state space as predicted by sign-
preserving evolutionary dynamics.
The first hypothesis coincides, not only with the predictions of Nash equilibrium, but
also with the predictions from a variety of widely employed behavioral models including
logit quantal response equilibrum [10], level-k [11, 12], and cognitive hierarchy models
[13], as all of these models yield predictions that are identical to Nash equilibrium for the
attacker-defender games under consideration.14 Thus a rejection of our first hypothesis
would not only falsify Nash equilibrium, but would also falsify several other widely
employed behavioral models.
The second hypothesis is drawn from the theoretical predictions of three widely used
dynamic evolutionary models: the best response dynamic [15], the Smith dynamic [16],
and the logit dynamic [17], each of which are described in detail in section 1.2.3. Our
second hypothesis reflects the starkly contrasting predictions across treatments from these
evolutionary models regarding behavioral stability. It should be noted that this bifurcation
in theoretical predictions across treatments is present neither in the Nash predictions nor
in the predictions from any of the other aforementioned behavioral solution concepts.
The third hypothesis reflects the characterization of disequilibrium behavior from
the class of continuous evolutionary models and the fourth hypothesis reflects the
characterization of disequilibrium behavior from the class of sign-preserving evolutionary
14To see why these these theoretical predictions are identical, recall that, in the attacker defender games
under consideration, both targets are equally valuable, so in equilibrium, attackers are equally likely to
attack each target and defenders are equally likely to defend each target. This is also the behavior that
occurs if agents pick their strategy purely at random, so the Nash equilibrium coincides with the predictions
from many solution concepts that describe some form of random behavioral noise. This feature of the
attacker-defender game under consideration is part of what allows our experimental design to provide a
sharp bifurcation between the theoretical predictions of evolutionary dynamics and those of other solution
concepts.
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models. To the extent that Nash equilibrium is said to model the long run limiting behavior
of experienced agents, it correspondingly fails to explicitly model the dynamic process
of convergence from which equilibrium emerges. In this sense, our third and fourth
hypotheses consider a prediction from dynamic evolutionary models regarding an aspect
of behavior that remains unmodeled by static behavioral solution concepts.
Nash
Prediction
Control
Treatment
Coordination
Treatment
mean distance from equilibrium to
social state
0 0.067 0.226
(0.012) (0.026)
mean proportion of defenders who
select strategy B
0.5 0.503 0.505
(0.013) (0.037)
std. dev. of proportion of defenders
who select strategy B
0 0.059 0.166
(0.014) (0.017)
mean proportion of attackers who
select strategy B
0.5 0.497 0.494
(0.006) (0.034)
std. dev. of proportion of attackers
who select strategy B
0 0.049 0.166
(0.009) (0.026)
Table 1.1: Summary statistics for strategy selection in the coordination treatment and the
control treatment. Here distance from equilibrium is measured as the mean euclidean
distance between the Nash equilibrium social state and the observed social state, so as to
maintain comparability with population proportions. Standard deviations across periods
are given in parenthesis.
23
Control Coordination
Deviation from Equilibrium
D
ev
ia
tio
n
0.
00
0.
05
0.
10
0.
15
0.
20
0.
25
Figure 1.4: Mean deviation from equilibrium across treatments.
1.5 Results
Table 1.1 provides summary statistics15 for the both coordination treatment and the
control treatment and a comparison with the equilibrium predictions. As discussed in
section 1.2, Nash equilibrium predictions are identical for both treatments: in equilibrium
attackers are equally likely to attack each target and defenders are equally likely to defend
each target. While the time-average of the observed behavior is highly consistent with the
Nash predictions, it fails to tell the whole story. In particular, time averaging the observed
within-period behavior would fail to detect both the striking differences in behavioral
dynamics across treatments, which which are discussed below.
15Standard deviations for this table are calculated across periods since, as predicted by evolutionary
models, aggregate behavior within a period is highly autocorrelated over time. Consequently, calculating
the standard deviation of the relevant statistics across periods provides a more conservative estimate than
calculating the total standard deviations of the high frequency data, which would largely capture within
period variation.
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Result 1. Subjects in the coordination treatment persistently exhibited significantly higher 
deviation from equilibrium than subjects in the control treatment.
The average social state exhibited considerably greater variance under the coordination 
treatment than under the control treatment. Consequently, as illustrated by figure 1.4, 
behavior in the coordination treatment is characterized by significantly larger deviations 
from equilibrium than the behavior observed under the control treatment. Here distance 
from equilibrium is measured as the mean Euclidean distance16 between the Nash 
equilibrium social state and the observed social state in the state space of the population 
game as described in section 1.2.1. Error bars indicate standard deviations across periods. 
In the control treatment the social state rapidly converged to a small neighborhood of Nash 
equilibrium, while, in the coordination treatment, the social state persistently maintained 
a large distance from the Nash equilibrium.
Result 2. In both treatments, the social state exhibited significantly c lockwise cyclical 
dynamics.
Subjects in both treatments exhibited significant clockwise behavioral cycles that orbit 
the Nash equilibrium social state. The presence of these clockwise cycles is consistent 
with the theoretical predictions from dynamic evolutionary models as discussed in section 
1.2.4. The continuous-time experimental design employed by this study provides the 
opportunity to characterize these features of disequilibrium behavior which are 
described by dynamic evolutionary models, but remain unaddressed in equilibrium models 
and are less accessible in discrete-time experimental studies. In particular, subjects in 
the control treatment exhibited clockwise behavioral cycles that rapidly converged to a 
small neighborhood around the Nash equilibrium social state. In contrast, subjects in
16This method of measuring distance maintains comparability with statistical measures characterizing 
proportions of a population.
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Figure 1.5: Mean value of the cycle rotation index across treatments.
the coordination treatment exhibited wider clockwise behavioral cycles that persistently
diverge from the Nash equilibrium social state.
Figure 1.5 compares the mean value of the cycle rotation index [21] under the control
treatment and the coordination treatment. Over all sixteen periods that implemented the
control treatment, the mean value of the cycle rotation index was 0.84 and the standard
deviation was 0.17. Similarly, over all sixteen periods that implemented the coordination
treatment, the mean value of the cycle rotation index was 0.93 and the standard deviation
was 0.14. Both treatments have significantly positive values of the cycle rotation index,
indicating that behavior in both treatments was characterized by significantly clockwise
cycles.
Figure 1.6 illustrates the observed behavior under each experimental treatment. The
left column depicts observed behavior under the control treatment. The right column
depicts the observed behavior under the coordination treatment. The upper row depicts
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the observed behavior during the first half of each period. The lower row depicts behavior
during the second half of each period. The horizontal axis in each graph represents the
proportion of attackers that choose to attack target 2 and the vertical axis in each graph
depicts the proportion of defenders that choose to defend target 2.
Result 3. The empirical limit cycles and smooth and remain strictly in the interior of the
state space.
As illustrated by figure 1.6, the empirical limit cycles remain strictly in the interior of
the state space, which contradicts theoretical predictions from sign preserving evolution-
ary dynamics,17 but is consistent with theoretical predictions from sign-correlated evolu-
tionary dynamics. In addition, the empirical limit cycles are smooth, which contradicts
theoretical predictions from the best response dynamic and the wider class of discontinu-
ous evolutionary dynamics, but is consistent with theoretical predictions from continuous
evolutionary dynamics, such as the Smith dynamic and the logit dynamic.
Result 4. The empirical switch rates strongly violate the widely employed assumption
of sign-preservation, that subjects exclusively adjust from lower performing strategies to
higher performing strategies.
Figure 1.7 illustrates the observed rate at which subjects switch from one strategy to
another, conditional on the difference in payoffs between the two strategies. Note that
this observed conditional switch rate changes smoothly in response to changes in relative
payoffs, supporting the assumption of continuity upheld by the Smith dynamic and the
logit dynamic but contrasting with the sharp reversal in switch rates predicted by the
best response dynamic. Further, note that subjects usually switch from lower performing
strategies to higher performing strategies, but they also frequently switched from higher
17See section 1.2.4 for more details regarding the theoretical predictions from sign preserving evolutionary
dynamics regarding the shape of limit cycles in coordinated attacker-defender population games
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performing strategies to lower performing strategies, strongly violating the assumption of
sign-preservation upheld by both the Smith dynamic and the best response dynamic, but
conforming to the weaker sign-correlation assumption maintained by the logit dynamic.
The observed violation of sign-preservation suggests that the wider class of sign-
correlated dynamic deserves further attention and may provide a superior characterization
of human behavior in dynamic environments. Moreover, the violation of sign-preservation
indicates that the fixed points of the empirical evolutionary dynamics may frequently
fail to correspond with Nash equilibria in some games. Further research is needed to
determine the extent to which sign-correlated evolutionary dynamics that violate sign-
preservation can predict and explain persistent deviations from equilibrium other strategic
environments.
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Figure 1.6: The observed path of the social state. The left column depicts observed
behavior under the control treatment. The right column depicts the observed behavior
under the coordination treatment. The upper row depicts the observed behavior during the
first half of each period. The lower row depicts behavior during the second half of each
period.
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Figure 1.7: The observed conditional switch rate. The vertical axis indicates the
percentage ρpij of subjects that choose to switch from strategy i to strategy j. The horizontal
axis indicates the difference in payoffs pipj − pipi .
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1.6 Conclusion
In this study, we experimentally test the empirical validity of dynamic evolutionary
models across population games exhibiting identical Nash equilibria but starkly different
evolutionary predictions. In particular, we vary coordination incentives across two
attacker-defender population games. Crucially, both Nash equilibrium and several other
behavioral models yield identical predictions for both of these experimental treatments. In
particular, Nash equilibrium [7], logit quantal response equilibrum [10], level-k [11, 12],
and cognitive hierarchy models [13] all yield identical predictions for both treatments.
In contrast, different evolutionary dynamics predict strikingly different behavior across
treatments. In particular, we consider three widely employed evolutionary dynamics:
the best response dynamic [15], the Smith dynamic [16], and the logit dynamic [17].
Although both treatments exhibit identical Nash equilibrium predictions, evolutionary
dynamics generally predict that the social state will only converge to Nash equilibrium
in our control treatment, and will exhibit persistent non-convergent limit cycles in the
coordination treatment.
The best response dynamic and the Smith dynamic are both sign-preserving but
the logit dynamic falls into the wider class of sign-correlated evolutionary dynamics.
Consequently, the best response dynamic and the Smith dynamic predict that limit cycles
in the coordination treatment will approach the boundary of the state space, while the
logit dynamic predicts that these limit cycles will remain strictly in the interior of the state
space. Further, the Smith dynamic and the logit dynamic are both continuous, but the best
response dynamic is discontinuous, so the Smith dynamic and the logit dynamic predict
that the social state will follow a smooth path, while the best response dynamic predicts
that the path of the social state will exhibit sudden directional changes when the best
response changes. This bifurcation between theoretical predictions across evolutionary
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dynamics and other behavioral models allows this chapter to provide a clean experimental
test of theoretical predictions from evolutionary game theory regarding aspects of dynamic
disequilibrium behavior that remain largely unaddressed by standard models.
Subjects in both both treatments adjusted their strategies continuously and earned con-
tinuous flow payoffs, providing fine-grained behavioral data and allowing for the obser-
vation of long term behavioral phenomena that may be difficult to observe in a discrete-
time setting. In accordance with theoretical predictions from evolutionary dynamics, sub-
ject behavior was tightly clustered around the Nash equilibrium in the control treatment
but widely dispersed from the Nash equilibrium in the coordination treatment. In fur-
ther agreement with evolutionary predictions, subjects also exhibited persistent clockwise
cyclic behavior under both experimental treatments. In contradiction to theoretical predic-
tions from the best response dynamic and the wider class of discontinuous evolutionary
dynamics, the empirical path of the social state was smooth and did not exhibit sudden
directional reversals when the best response changed, suggesting the continuous evolu-
tionary dynamics may provide a more accurate depiction of human behavior than discon-
tinuous models such as the best response dynamic. In contradiction to the predictions
from the conventional class sign-preserving dynamics the empirical limit cycles remained
strictly in the interior of the state space, suggesting that the wider class of sign-correlated
dynamics deserves further attention and may provide a superior characterization of human
behavior in dynamic environments.
While classical game theory focuses primarily on modeling equilibrium behavior, our
experimental results suggest that evolutionary models of disequilibrium behavior can yield
valuable insights. In contrast to the equilibrium predictions, our results suggest that the
introduction of coordination incentives can prevent convergence to Nash equilibrium in
attacker defender games, leading to autocorrelated attacks and making the behavior of
attackers more predictable. These results may have important policy implications for
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strategic environments that are modeled by attacker-defender games such as network
security [27], property crime [33], and counter-terrorism [28]. In particular, these results
suggest that policy makers ought not to rely exclusively on equilibrium models, or even
on the wider class of static behavioral models, but should also consider predictions from
evolutionary dynamics. Further, these results indicate that some classes of dynamic
evolutionary models may provide a superior characterization of human behavior, namely
continuous sign-correlated evolutionary dynamics. Finally, it should be noted that these
results do not invalidate the use of equilibrium solution concepts. Rather, they suggest that
evolutionary models can help identify where equilibrium models are most reliable and can
characterize disequilibrium behavior where equilibrium models are less reliable.
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2. DESIGNING MECHANISMS THAT RELIABLY CONVERGE
2.1 Motivation
Children in the United States are traditionally assigned to public schools based
exclusively on where they live. However, a growing number of public school districts now
allow parents to indicate their preferences over schools. Since each school can support
only a limited number of students, it is often impossible to give every student her top
choice of schools. To resolve these shortages, policy makers frequently employ student
assignment mechanisms that assign each student to a school based on both reported student
preferences and legally determined student priorities.
Under some of these mechanisms, participants have an incentive to strategically
misreport their preferences. Some parent groups have even explicitly recommended
particular misreporting strategies.1 Misreported preferences prevent policymakers from
accurately evaluating mechanism efficiency and make it difficult to reliably achieve
policy goals. To encourage truthful preference reports, mechanism designers typically
recommend the use of strategy-proof assignment mechanisms under which participants
never have an incentive to misreport their preferences. However, previous studies2 have
found that even strategy-proof mechanisms fail to reliably induce truthful preference
revelation from boundedly rational participants.
Standard implementations of school choice mechanisms only reveal assignments at
the end of the reporting period, after all preference reports have been finalized. In
contrast, this paper considers school choice mechanisms that provide participants with
continuous assignment feedback. Under such mechanisms, each subject is shown her
1See Abdulkadiroglu et al. [34] for more details regarding these misreporting strategies.
2For example, Chen and Sönmez [35] find that subjects misrepresent their preferences 50% of the time
under a top trading cycles mechanism. Similarly, Pais and Pintér [36] find that subjects misrepresent their
preferences 33% of the time under a full information deferred acceptance mechanism.
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current assignment throughout the preference reporting period, before preference reports
are finalized. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to experimentally
investigate such mechanisms. By providing increased opportunity for learning and
adjustment, continuous assignment feedback is hypothesized to reduce confusion and
promote rational preference revelation. To test this hypothesis, this study implements
both discrete feedback and continuous feedback treatments for three widely employed
school choice mechanisms: the deferred acceptance mechanism, the top trading cycles
mechanism, and the Boston mechanism.
At present, barriers to implementing continuous assignment feedback are largely com-
putational. Hence as computational power increases, this type of feedback will become
increasingly feasible. Computationally simpler forms of continuous feedback are already
being employed by some school districts. Specifically, continuous feedback regarding the
first choices of other participants under the boston mechanism has been provided by the
Wake County Public School System [37]. Similarly, Inner Mongolia provides continuous
feedback in a dynamic queuing mechanism where subjects exclusively report their first
choices [38].
Both top trading cycles and deferred acceptance are strategy proof mechanisms, so
both have a Nash equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies under which participants
truthfully report their preferences. Under the top-trading cycles mechanism, this truthful
equilibrium always yields a Pareto optimal assignment. Under the deferred acceptance
mechanism, the truthful equilibrium always yields an assignment that eliminates justified
envy. Unlike the other two mechanisms under consideration, the Boston mechanism is
manipulable. It has no dominant strategy equilibrium and participants frequently have an
incentive to misreport their preferences. Nevertheless, as discussed by Ergin and Sönmez
[39], the set of equilibrium assignments under the Boston mechanism coincide exactly
with the set of assignments that eliminate justified envy.
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This study connects two distinct strands of literature: the school choice literature
in mechanism design theory, and experimental literature investigating dynamic behavior
in continuous-time games. The school choice mechanism design literature provides
an axiomatic analysis of rational preference revelation behavior under school choice
mechanisms. Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez [40] describe the school choice problem and
discuss the fundamental tradeoff between Pareto efficiency and the elimination of justified
envy. They also describe a variation of the top trading cycles mechanism introduced by
Shapley and Scarf [41] which we investigate in this study. A powerful characterization of
the Nash equilibria of the Boston mechanism was provided by Ergin and Sönmez [39] and
the student optimal deferred acceptance mechanism was described by Gale and Shapley
[42].
Previous experimental studies, such as Chen and Sönmez [35], conducted school
choice mechanisms in discrete periods, which is ideal for the study of static one-
shot mechanisms. In contrast, continuous-time experimental studies have successfully
investigated dynamic behavior in a variety strategic settings involving continuous-time
interaction. For example, Cason et al. [21] conduct a experimental investigation of
dynamic behavior in continuous-time rock-paper-scissors games and Oprea et al. [20]
conduct a continuous-time experimental study of evolutionary dynamics in the Hawk-
Dove game. Both studies provide subjects with continuous feedback and allow subjects
to adjust their strategies asynchronously. Unlike these experimental studies, this study
employs continuous time experimental methodology to investigate dynamic preference
revelation behavior in widely employed school choice mechanisms under continuous
feedback.
This study finds that the provision of continuous assignment feedback helps school
choice mechanisms to achieve equilibrium assignments significantly more often than con-
ventional discrete feedback implementations. Discrete feedback mechanisms persistently
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fail to reach equilibrium assignments due to the presence of behavioral noise in prefer-
ence reports. In contrast, participants exhibited significantly less behavioral noise and
significantly stronger convergence to equilibrium under continuous assignment feedback.
Accordingly, the top trading cycles mechanism achieved greater efficiency under con-
tinuous feedback while the deferred acceptance mechanism and the Boston mechanisms
eliminated significantly more justified envy under continuous feedback. These results sug-
gest that the implementation of continuous feedback mechanisms can provide participants
with greater opportunity for learning and adjustment, leading to more rational preference
reports and significantly increasing the ability of policy makers to achieve policy goals in
their school district.
2.2 Theory
2.2.1 The School Choice Environment
This study experimentally investigates a simple school choice environment that
illustrates the fundamental tradeoff between Pareto efficiency and the elimination of
justified envy.3 Each school can accept up to n students and each student can be assigned
to only one school. Students have strict preferences over schools and schools have strict
priority rankings over students. Here there are three types of students and there are n
students of each type. Student preferences over schools are given by
Student 1 2 3
b a a
Preference a b b
c c c
where higher vertical position indicates a higher preference ranking, so type 1 students
prefer school b over school a and prefer school a over school c. Similarly, school priority
3A similar example with only one student of each type was discussed by Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez
[40] and Roth [43].
37
rankings over students are given by
School a b c
1 2 2
Priority 3 1 1
2 3 3
where priorities rankings between students of the same type are determined by lottery.
A student x is said to have justified envy towards a student y if the student x prefers the
school that is assigned to y and x also ranked higher at this school than y. If no student has
justified envy under an assignment we say that the assignment eliminates justified envy.
In general, several distinct assignments may eliminate justified envy. However, in this
environment, the only assignment that eliminates justified envy is given by
µ =
1 2 3
a b c

where all type 1 students are assigned to school a, all type 2 students are assigned to
school b, and all type 3 students are assigned to school c. However, this assignment is
Pareto dominated by the assignment
λ =
1 2 3
b a c

where all type 1 students are assigned to school b, all type 2 students are assigned
to school a, and all type 3 students are assigned to school c. The assignment λ Pareto
dominates the assignment µ because types 1 and 2 prefer the schools they receive under λ
to the schools they receive under µ and student 3 receives the same school under λ as she
does under µ. However, λ fails to eliminate justified envy because type 3 students have
justified envy towards type 2 students under λ. Specifically, student 3 would prefer school
a over school c, and school a gives student 3 a higher priority than student 2.
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Since the unique assignment µ that eliminates justified envy is Pareto dominated
by λ, no Pareto optimal assignment can eliminate justified envy in this environment.
Furthermore, in general, no student assignment mechanism can guarantees both the
elimination justified envy and Pareto optimality. Consequently, policy makers face a
fundamental tradeoff between Pareto efficiency and the elimination of justified envy in
school choice environments.
2.2.2 Student Assignment Mechanisms
Student assignment mechanisms select an assignment of students to schools based
on the priority rankings of each school and the preferences reported by students. Since
it is impossible for any student assignment mechanism to ensure both Pareto optimality
and the elimination of justified envy, the optimal student assignment mechanism for
a particular school district depends partly on the particular goals of the policy maker.
Hence different school districts might reasonably employ different student assignment
mechanisms. In particular, this paper considers three widely employed assignment
mechanisms: the Boston mechanism, the top trading cycles mechanism, and the deferred
acceptance mechanism.
A student x is said to have justified envy towards a student y if the student x prefers the
school s that is assigned to student y and the student x also has higher priority at school s
than student y. If no student has justified envy under an assignment then we say that the
assignment eliminates justified envy. A mechanism is said to eliminate justified envy if it
always selects an assignment that eliminates justified envy under the reported preferences.
Similarly, a mechanism is Pareto optimal if it always selects an assignment that is Pareto
optimal under the reported preferences. We say that a mechanism is strategy proof if no
student can ever benefit by unilaterally misreporting her preferences.
Under the Boston mechanism, each student initially applies to her top choice of schools
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according to her reported preferences. Each school accepts applicants in priority order 
until it runs out of seats. The remaining students apply to their second choice of schools 
according to their reported preferences. Again, each school accepts students in priority 
order until it runs out of seats. This process repeats until every student is assigned to a 
school.
When students truthfully report their preferences, the Boston mechanism selects 
a Pareto optimal assignment. Yet the Boston mechanism is not strategy proof, so 
students can often benefit b y m isreporting t heir p references. E rgin a nd S önmez [39] 
show that the set of Nash equilibrium assignments under the Boston Mechanism exactly 
coincide with the set of matchings that eliminate justified envy under the true preferences. 
However, these equilibrium assignments may be Pareto dominated. In this school choice 
environment,4 the sole assignmentµ that eliminates justified e nvy i s t he u nique Nash 
equilibrium assignment for the Boston mechanism. However, no students receive their 
most preferred school under this assignment. Moreover, it is Pareto dominated by the  
Pareto optimal assignment λ where type 1 students and type 2 students receive their most 
preferred schools.
Under the student optimal deferred acceptance mechanism, each student initially 
applies to her top choice of schools according to her reported preferences. Each school 
tentatively accepts applicants in priority order until it runs out of seats. The remaining 
applications are rejected. Students whose applications were rejected then apply to their 
next highest choice of schools. Next, each school considers its new applicants along side 
those it has already tentatively accepted. It then tentatively accepts its top priority students 
among this group until it run out of seats and rejects the remaining students. This process 
repeats until every student is assigned to a school.
Unlike the Boston mechanism, the deferred acceptance mechanism is strategy proof,
4See section 2.2.1 for details regarding the school choice environment under consideration
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so students never have an incentive to misreport their preferences. When sudents truthfully 
report their preferences, the deferred acceptance mechanism always selects an assignment 
that eliminates justified envy under the t rue p references. Yet even when s tudents report 
their preferences truthfully, the deferred acceptance mechanism does not always select a 
Pareto optimal assignment. In the this school choice environment, the deferred acceptance 
mechanism selects the sole assignment µ that eliminates justified envy when students 
report their preferences truthfully. However, it is Pareto dominated by the Pareto optimal 
assignment λ where type 1 students and type 2 students receive their most preferred 
schools. Furthermore, none of students receive their most preferred school under the 
dominant strategy Nash equilibrium assignment µ.
The top trading cycles mechanism constructs a directed graph based the reported 
preferences and priorities. Each student points to her most preferred school according 
to her reported preferences and each school points to it’s highest priority student. Since 
there are a finite number of schools and students, the resulting directed graph will have at 
least one cycle. Students who are part of a cycle are assigned to the school they point to 
and removed from the directed graph. Next, each of the remaining students point to their 
most preferred school according to their reported preferences among those schools that 
still have open seats. Each school points to their highest priority student among those that 
remain unassigned. Any students who are part of a cycle are assigned to the school they 
point to. This process repeats until every student is assigned to a school.
The top trading cycles mechanism strategy proof, so students have no incentive to 
misreport their preferences. However, unlike the deferred acceptance mechanism, the 
top trading cycles mechanism always selects a Pareto optimal assignment when students 
truthfully report their preferences. However, when students report truthfully report their 
preferences, the top trading cycles mechanism does not always select an assignment 
that eliminates justified e nvy. I n t his s chool c hoice e nvironment,4 t he P areto optimal
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Figure 2.1: Equibrium Assignment Percentages under the Best Response Dynamic
assignment λ is the dominant strategy Nash equilibrium assignment for the top trading
cycles mechanism. Under this assignment, type 1 students and type 2 students receive
their most preferred school, while Type 3 students receive their least preferred school.
Hence two thirds of the student population receive their most preferred school. However,
this assignment does not eliminate justified envy since it gives type 3 students justified
envy towards type 1 students.
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2.2.3 Adaptive Dynamics Under Continuous Feedback
Previous experimental studies5 find that, under discrete feedback, even strategy-proof
mechanisms may fail to reliably induce truthful preference revelation when participants
exhibit bounded rationality. These failures to induce truthful preference revelation
may result from bounded rationality, confusion, or disbelief regarding the incentives
presented by strategy proof mechanisms. To ameliorate these problems, this study
considers the implementation of school choice mechanisms with continuous feedback
where participants receive information regarding their tentative assignments throughout
the preference reporting period.
The provision of continuous feedback has no effect on the Nash equilibria of the
school choice mechanisms under consideration because assignments remain exclusively
determined by the preference reports selected at the end of the reporting period. However,
by allowing for adaptive learning and adjustment, the provision continuous feedback may
induce boundedly rational agents to exhibit increasingly rational preference revelation
behavior, thus helping school choice mechanisms to achieve their respective equilibrium
assignments. Adaptive models can describe the behavior of boundedly rational agents in
continuous time strategic environments, such as school choice mechanisms that provide
continuous feedback. Here, we consider the best response dyanamic described by Gilboa
and Matsui [15] and Matsui [44], under which agents asynchronously switch to one of
their myopic best responses. This adaptive dynamic is also closely related to the fictitious
play dynamic discussed by Brown [32].
Figure 2.1 depicts the predictions of the best response dynamic under school choice
mechanisms with continuous feedback. Here the horizontal axis denotes time over the
5For example, Chen and Sönmez [35] find that subjects misrepresent their preferences 50% of the time
under a top trading cycles mechanism with discrete feedback. Similarly, Pais and Pintér [36] find that
subjects misrepresent their preferences 33% of the time under a deferred acceptance mechanism with decrete
feedback.
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course of a reporting period and the vertical axis denotes the percentage of participants
receiving their equilibrium assignment. Each line depicts the mean path of a particular
school choice mechanism under the best response dynamic in the school choice envi-
ronment.6 Note that both the deferred acceptance mechanism and the top trading cycles
mechanism rapidly converge to equilibrium, while the Boston mechanism converges more
slowly and exhibits persistent deviation from equilibrium, suggesting that the manipulabil-
ity of the Boston mechanism can lead to dynamic instability under continuous feedback.
2.3 Experimental Design
This study implements a 2x3 experimental design with six experimental treatments
which are illustrated by table 2.1. Each column of this table denotes one three widely
employed school choice mechanisms: the deferred acceptance mechanism, the top
trading cycles mechanism, and the Boston mechanism. For each mechanism, the study
implements one treatment with continuous feedback and one treatment with discrete
feedback. Three experimental sessions were conducted for each of the six treatment
blocks. Each session was conducted with twenty-four subjects. Each subject participated
in only one experimental session. All sessions were conducted at the Texas A&M
Economic Research Laboratory.
6See section 2.2.1 for details regarding the school choice environment under consideration
Top Trading
Cycles
Deferred
Acceptance Boston
Discrete Feedback 3 Sessions 3 Sessions 3 Sessions
Continuous Feedback 3 Sessions 3 Sessions 3 Sessions
Table 2.1: 3x2 Experimental Design with Three Sessions Per Block
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2.4 Experimental Procedures
During each experimental session, subjects were divided into three groups of eight
participants. Members of each group were assigned one of the three student types
described in section 2.2.1. Each experimental session consisted of twelve periods, and
each period lasted for exactly one minute. At the beginning of each period, subjects were
informed about the earnings that they could receive from being assigned each of the three
options: a, b, or c. This information remained visible to subjects for the duration of the
experimental session. To avoid the possibility of introducing any psychological ordering
or labeling bias, the labeling for each school and the order in which the options were
presented was randomly reassigned at the beginning of each period.
Throughout each reporting period, subjects were free to adjust their preference reports
as frequently as desired. At the end of each period, all preference reports were finalized
and assignments were made based on these finalized preference reports. Figure 2.2
depicts the experimental interface under continuous feedback and figure 2.3 illustrates the
experimental interface under discrete feedback. Under the discrete feedback treatment,
subjects could only observed their assignments at the end of each reporting period,
after all preference reports were finalized. In contrast, under the continuous feedback
treatment, subjects could also observe their tentative assignments under the currently
selected preference reports throughout the one minute reporting period. At the end of
each session, subjects were paid the average of their earnings over all periods plus a five
dollar participation bonus.
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Figure 2.2: Experimental Interface under Continuous Feedback
46
Figure 2.3: Experimental Interface under Discrete Feedback
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2.5 Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1. School choice mechanisms will achieve equilibrium assignments more often
when they provide continuous feedback than when they only provide discrete feedback.
Although the provision of continuous feedback has no effect on the Nash equilibria
of the school choice mechanisms under consideration, it can help school choice mecha-
nisms to achieve equilibrium assignments even in the presence of bounded rationality by
giving participants more opportunity for learning and adjustment. When provided with
continuous feedback, boundedly rational agents can converge towards equilibrium assign-
ments by asynchronously adjusting towards their myopic best response.7 However, this
asynchronous process of myopic adjustment can not occur period if subjects only receive
discrete feedback, so the provision of continuous feedback is expected to significantly
increase the proportion of participants that receive their equilibrium assignments.
Hypothesis 2. The top trading cycles mechanism will assign more students their most
preferred school when it provides continuous feedback than when it only provides receive
discrete feedback.
In this school choice environment,8 the dominant strategy Nash equilibrium of the top
trading cycles mechanism yields the Pareto efficient assignment λwhich assigns two thirds
of the student population receives their most preferred school. Moreover, school a is the
favorite of both type 2 students and type 3 students, so it is not possible to assign more than
two thirds of students their most preferred option. Hence if the provision of continuous
feedback makes the top trading cycles mechanism more likely to achieve equilibrium
assignments, then it also increases the proportion of students that receive their favorite
school. However, it should be noted that λ does not eliminate justified envy. In particular,
7See section 2.2.3 for more details regarding the theoretical predictions of the best response dynamic.
8See section 2.2.1 for details regarding the school choice environment.
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it gives type 3 students justified envy towards type 2 students.
Hypothesis 3. The deferred acceptance mechanism will eliminate more justified envy
when it provides continuous feedback than when it only provides discrete feedback.
The deferred acceptance mechanism is strategy proof and eliminates justified envy, so
its dominant strategy Nash equilibrium yields the unique assignment µ which completely
eliminates justified envy under the true preferences in this school choice environment.
Thus if the provision of continuous feedback makes the deferred acceptance mechanism
more likely to achieve equilibrium assignments, then it will also increase the elimination
justified envy. However, the assignment µ is not Pareto optimal and it does not give any
of the students their most preferred school, so we do not expect continuous feedback to
increase the proportion of of students who are assigned their favorite schools under the
deferred acceptance mechanism.
Hypothesis 4. The Boston mechanism will eliminate more justified envy when it provides
continuous feedback than when it only provides discrete feedback.
Although the Boston mechanism is not strategy proof, all of its Nash equilibria elimi-
nate justified envy under the true preferences. Thus, in this school choice environment, its
Nash equilibria yield the aforementioned assignment µ, which eliminates justified envy but
does not give any participant their most preferred school. Hence if the provision of con-
tinuous feedback makes the Boston mechanism more likely to achieve equilibrium assign-
ments, then it also increases the elimination justified envy. However, as noted in section
2.2.3, the best response dynamic predicts that the Boston mechanism will exhibit greater
dynamic instability than the other two mechanisms, so it may achieve less elimination
of justified envy than the deferred acceptance mechanism in the presence of continuous
feedback.
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Feedback t-test Joint F-test
Discrete Continuous p-value p-value
Top Trading Cycles 0.76273 0.92130 <0.001
<0.001Deferred Acceptance 0.69097 0.98148 <0.001
Boston 0.20255 0.89236 <0.001
Table 2.2: Hypothesis tests regarding the proportion of equilibrium assignments. The unit
of observation is one period.
2.6 Results
Result 5. All three school choice mechanisms achieved equilibrium assignments signifi-
cantly more often when they provided subjects with continuous feedback than when they
provided subjects with discrete feedback.
Figure 2.4 illustrates the proportion of equilibrium assignments under each of the
six experimental treatments. The vertical axis denotes the percentage of subjects who
received their dominant strategy equilibrium assignment. The three mechanisms under
consideration, are listed along the horizontal axis. For each of these mechanisms,
the height of the left-hand bar denotes the percentage of equilibrium assignments
under discrete feedback and the height of the right-hand bar denotes the percentage of
equilibrium assignments under continuous feedback. Error bars indicate 95% confidence
intervals on the percentage of equilibrium assignments.
A t-test finds that each of these mechanisms achieve equilibrium assignments signif-
icantly more often under continuous feedback than under discrete feedback at the one
percent level. An F-test rejects the joint hypotheses of equal equilibrium assignment per-
centages across feedback treatments at the one percent level. Although the provision of
continuous feedback has no effect on the Nash equilibria of these school choice mecha-
nisms, this result is consistent with the theoretical predictions of adaptive models.9 By
9See section 2.2.3 for more details regarding the predictions of adaptive models.
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Figure 2.4: Proportion of Equilibrium Assignments by Treatment
allowing for adaptive learning and adjustment, the provision continuous feedback may
induce boundedly rational agents to exhibit more rational preference revelation behavior,
thus helping these school choice mechanisms to achieve their respective equilibrium as-
signments.
Result 6. All three school choice mechanisms eliminated significantly more justified envy
when they provided subjects with continuous feedback than when they provided subjects
with discrete feedback.
Figure 2.5 illustrates the elimination of justified envy under each of the six treatments.
The vertical axis denotes the percentage of subjects who had no justified envy towards
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Figure 2.5: Elimination of Justified Envy by Treatment
others under their true preferences.10 The three mechanisms under consideration, are listed
along the horizontal axis. For each of these mechanisms, the height of the left-hand bar
denotes the elimination of justified envy under discrete feedback and the height of the
right-hand bar denotes the elimination of justified envy under continuous feedback. Error
bars indicate 95% confidence intervals on the percentage of students without justified envy.
A t-test finds that all three of these school choice mechanisms eliminate significantly
more justified envy under continuous feedback than under discrete feedback at the one
percent level. An F-test rejects the joint hypotheses of equal justified envy elimination
10A formal definition for the concept of justified envy can be found in section 2.2.2
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Feedback t-test Joint F-test
Discrete Continuous p-value p-value
Top Trading Cycles 0.53241 0.62963 <0.001
<0.001Deferred Acceptance 0.82755 0.98843 <0.001
Boston 0.59259 0.94097 <0.001
Table 2.3: Hypothesis tests regarding the elimination of justified envy. The unit of
observation is one period.
rates across feedback treatments at the one percent level. As discussed in section 2.2.2, the
assignment µ that uniquely eliminates justified envy in this environment is the equilibrium
outcome for both the deferred acceptance mechanism and the Boston mechanism. Hence
this result is consistent with the increase in equilibrium assignments from continuous
feedback under these two mechanisms.
In contrast, the increase in the elimination of justified envy under the top trading cycles
mechanism occurs because it eliminated so little justified envy under discrete feedback. In
equilibrium, the top trading cycles mechanism eliminates justified envy from only two
thirds of the student population, which is roughly consistent with the observed elimination
of justified envy under the top trading cycles mechanism. Yet under discrete feedback,
the top trading cycles mechanism eliminated even less justified envy, so the increase in
equilibrium assignments from continuous feedback increased the elimination of justified
envy despite the presence of justified envy in the equilibrium assignment of the top trading
cycles mechanism.
Result 7. The top trading cycles mechanism gave subjects their most preferred option
significantly more often when it provided subjects with continuous feedback than when
they provided subjects with discrete feedback.
Figure 2.6 illustrates the proportion of most preferred assignments under each of the
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Figure 2.6: Proportion Assigned most Preferred Option by Treatment
six treatments. The vertical axis here denotes the percentage of subjects who who were
assigned their favorite option under their true preferences. The three mechanisms under
consideration, are listed along the horizontal axis. For each of these mechanisms, the
height of the left-hand bar denotes the percentage of most preferred assignments under
under discrete feedback and the height of the right-hand bar denotes the percentage of most
preferred assignments under continuous feedback. Error bars indicate 95% confidence
intervals on the percentage of students receiving their most preferred assignments.
A t-test finds that the top trading cycles mechanism assigned subjects their most pre-
ferred option significantly more often under continuous feedback than under discretfeed-
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Feedback t-test Joint F-test
Discrete Continuous p-value p-value
Top Trading Cycles 0.48727 0.59722 <0.001
<0.001Deferred Acceptance 0.18750 0.01042 <0.001
Boston 0.52431 0.06134 <0.001
Table 2.4: Hypothesis tests regarding the proportion of most preferred assignments. The
unit of observation is one period.
back at the one percent level. An F-test rejects the joint hypotheses of equal percentages
of most preferred assignments across feedback treatments at the one percent level. In con-
trast, the deferred acceptance mechanism and the Boston mechanism assigned subjects
their most preferred option significantly less often under continuous feedback than under
discrete feedback at the one percent level. These results are consistent with the increase
in equilibrium assignments under continuous feedback since the top trading cycles mech-
anism assigns two thirds of subjects their most preferred option in equilibrium while the
other two mechanisms do not assign any students their most preferred option in equilib-
rium.
2.7 Conclusion
Classical mechanism design theory predicts that strategy proof mechanisms will
reliably induce truthful preference reports and achieve equilibrium outcomes. However,
these theoretical predictions are difficult to verify in the field because real world
preferences are unobservable and real world school choice mechanisms rarely satisfy the
exact assumptions of theory. Hence experimental data can provide valuable information
regarding the empirical properties of school choice mechanisms and allow more conclusive
testing of predictions from mechanism design theory.
Previous studies find that strategy-proof student assignment mechanisms fail to reliably
achieve equilibrium outcomes or induce truthful preference revelation in laboratory
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experiments. We hypothesize that these findings result from bounded rationality on the
part of participants in these strategy-proof mechanisms. Moreover, we suspect that similar
types of bounded rationality play an important role in the field. To reduce confusion and
increase understanding, we consider the implementation of school choice mechanisms
that provide participants with continuous feedback regarding their school assignments
throughout the reporting period. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to
experimentally investigate such mechanisms.
To investigate the empirical properties of widely employed school choice mechanisms
under continuous assignment feedback, this study conducts laboratory experiments
comparing assignment outcomes and preference revelation behavior across continuous
feedback and discrete feedback school choice mechanisms. In these experiments, all three
school choice mechanisms achieved equilibrium assignments significantly more often
when they provided subjects with continuous feedback than when they only provided
discrete feedback. Consistent with the theoretical predictions from adaptive models,
these experimental results suggest that the provision of continuous feedback in school
choice mechanisms can help promote rational preference revelation behavior by giving
participants more opportunity for learning and adjustment.
Student assignment mechanisms impact the well being of children in many school
districts throughout the world. The Boston mechanism was originally used in Boston’s
school choice system. In 2012, the New Orleans recovery school district used an algorithm
based on the top trading cycles assignment mechanism [45]. In 2008, a variation of the
student optimal deferred acceptance mechanism was employed in New York City [46].
By investigating continuous assignment feedback, this study can help policy makers to
design better school choice mechanisms to achieve the policy goals of their school district.
Furthermore, the analysis of continuous feedback may to continue to help researchers
design new mechanisms that are more robust the presence of bounded rationality.
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3. CONCLUSIONS: CYCLICAL BEHAVIOR IN THE ALL PAY AUCTION
3.1 Motivation
Nash Equilibrium is a powerful tool for understanding strategic behavior. Even when
agents fall short of perfect rationality, simple adaptive processes can often drive long-
run behavior towards equilibrium predictions. For this reason, adaptive models have long
been employed to justify the application of equilibrium solution concepts in the presence
of bounded rationality [6, 47]. In many strategic environments, the long run predictions
of adaptive models closely resemble the predictions of Nash equilibrium. However,
in other strategic environments, adaptive models fail to converge, leading to persistent
disequilibrium behavior. In such environments, adaptive models characterize both the
degree of deviation from equilibrium and the disequilibrium behavioral dynamics.
To test these theoretical predictions from adaptive models, we conduct laboratory
experiments on continuous-time all-pay auctions where subjects adjust their bids asyn-
chronously and earn flow payoffs continuously over time. In one treatment, the single
highest bidder receives a prize. In another treatment, the top two bidders each receive
an equally valuable prize. Nash equilibrium predicts identical payoff distributions under
both of these treatments, but adaptive models predict predict disequilibrium bidding cy-
cles, running contrary to the equilibrium predictions and disrupting the equality of payoffs
across treatments. In contrast to the Nash equilibrium predictions, but consistent with the
predictions of adaptive models, we observe lower behavioral stability and higher payoffs
in all-pay auctions with two winners than in all-pay auctions with a single winner.
The all-pay auction has been examined extensively in experimental environments [see
48, for a survey]. Previous experimental studies [e.g., 49, 50, 51] of the all-pay auction
conduct a sequence of discrete rounds in which subjects secretly select their bids and the
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highest bidder receives a price. The paper also contributes to the small, but burgeoning
area of literature that studies the properties of disequilibrium dynamics in continuous-time
games [i.e., 20, 21]. Consistent with the observation of cyclical behavior in rock-paper-
scissors by Cason et al., we observe bidding cycles in continuous-time all-pay auctions.
This paper proceeds as follows: Section 3.2 presents the structure of the game and two
different equilibrium models. It also describes and the various adaptive models that will
be used to characterize the experimental data. Section 3.3 presents the full design and
procedures of the experiment. Section 3.4 provides our hypotheses. Section 3.5 presents
the main results and Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Theory
In all-pay auctions, multiple agents expend costly effort to compete over a limited
number of prizes. Prizes are awarded to the agents who expend the most effort, but
every agent bears the cost of her own effort, even if she does not win a prize. All-pay
auctions often model strategic environments that involve both conflict and non-recoverable
costs such as political lobbying [52], patent races [53], biological competition [54], and
international warfare [55].
The all-pay auction involves three players who compete over two prizes. Each player
i starts with a endowment w and selects her bid bi from the closed interval [0, w]. The
top two bidders each receive a prize with value v and the lowest bidder receives no prize.
Every player must pay her bid, regardless of whether or not she won a prize. In the case
of a tie, the winner is determined randomly. Accordingly, the payoff function for player i
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is given by:
pii (bi, bj, bk) =

w − bi + v if bi > min {bj, bk}
w − bi + 2v/3 if bi = bj = bk
w − bi + v/2 if bi = min {bj, bk} < max {bj, bk}
w − bi otherwise
(3.1)
3.2.1 Equilibrium Models
We consider equilibrium models including the Nash equilibrium and the logit quantal
response equilibrium. Nash equilibrium assumes that each agent selects a best response
to the strategies selected by others. In contrast, the logit quantal response equilibrium
assumes that agents make probabilistic errors in their payoff evaluations.
The all-pay auction investigated here with three bidders and two winners has no pure
strategy Nash equilibrium, but it does have a unique symmetric mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium. First derived by [56],1 the corresponding probability density function for
the bid of player i given by
f (bi) =
1
2v
(
1− bi
v
)−1/2
for all bi ∈ [0, v]. (3.2)
The black line in Figure 3.1 illustrates this equilibrium density function. Note that that
Nash equilibrium probability density function approaches infinity as bids approaches the
value of the prize and remains at zero for any bid above the value of the prize. Thus, in
equilibrium players are likely to bid near the value of the prize but never above it.
While the Nash equilibrium describes the behavior of perfectly rational and perfectly
precise agents, the logit quantal response equilibrium described by [10] and [57] allows
1Appendix Section 4.1 contains an alternate derivation of the equilibrium.
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Figure 3.1: Nash Equilibrium and Logit Quantal Response Equilibria
us to model the behavior of imprecise boundedly rational agents. Such agents make
probabilistic errors in their evaluation of alternate strategies. Although they typically fail
to select a best response, they are more likely to select strategies that yield higher payoffs.
Unlike the perfectly rational agents described by Nash equilibrium, agents in logit
quantal response equilibrium may place positive probability on dominated strategies, since
their behavior is fundamentally stochastic. In the case of a continuous strategy space, the
probability density function for the logit quantal response equilibrium mixed strategy σi
satisfies:
f (bi) =
exp (η−1pii (bi, σ−i))∫
exp (η−1pii (x, σ−i)) dx
(3.3)
Here η denotes the level of behavioral noise in an agent’s evaluation of payoffs. When
η is small, agents make small errors, and the strategy distribution approaches the Nash
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equilibrium. When η is large, the logit quantal response equilibrium approaches uniformly
random play. To illustrate this tendency, Figure 3.1 depicts the logit quantal response
equilibrium under alternate values of η.
A closed form solution for the logit quantal response equilibrium of an all-pay auction
with a single prize is provided by [58]. To the best of our knowledge, no closed form
solution is currently available for the logit quantal response equilibrium of an all-pay
auction with two prizes. Accordingly, a formal derivation of the logit quantal response
equilibrium in this case is found in Appendix Section 4.2. The logit quantal response
equilibrium probability density function for the bid of player i is
f (bi) =
ηG
(√
ηv
)
exp (−ηbi)√
ηv [1− exp (−ηw)]
[
exp
(
G−1
(
G (
√
ηv)
[
1− 1− exp (−ηbi)
1− exp (−ηw)
])2)]−1
,
(3.4)
where G (x) =
∫ x
0
exp (u2) du =
√
pi
2
erfi (x).
3.2.2 Evolutionary Game Theory
The experiment in this paper involves continuous-time, two good, three-bidder all pay
auctions. These auctions are conducted in groups of three, but subjects’ rewards are
calculated using mean matching, so essentially every subject plays every other subject
all the time. In situations like these, it is useful to consider models from evolutionary
game theory, the study of “large populations of agents who repeatedly engage in strategic
interactions," [8].
By design, this all-pay auction has evolutionary dynamics that make it a prime
candidate for persistent disequilibrium. Accordingly, it has no evolutionary stable strategy.
The idea of an evolutionarily stable strategy was introduced by [25], who employed it to
identify the stability of biological phenotypes in large populations under the pressures
of mutation and natural selection. More recently, game theorists and social scientists have
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employed evolutionary stability criteria to model the behavioral stability of Nash equilibria
in a wide variety of strategic settings.2
A strategy is evolutionarily stable if it induces a self-enforcing convention. That is,
a strategy x is evolutionarily stable if no other strategy y can invade it when the entire
population initially employs strategy x. More formally, in a in a symmetric normal form
game, a strategy x is evolutionarily stable if there exists some C ∈ (0, 1) such that for all
ε ∈ (0, C) and for any other strategy y
pi ( x | y + (1− )x ) > pi ( y | y + (1− )x ) (3.5)
Thus, if x is evolutionarily stable and a sufficiently small proportion of the population
deviates to an alternate strategy y, then agents who employ x will earn a strictly higher
payoff than agents who employ y.
The Nash equilibrium strategy for the all-pay auction is not evolutionarily stable. Too
see why, suppose that a small proportion  of the population deviates from the Nash
equilibrium strategy x to an alternate strategy y under which agents always bid the full
value of the prize. Since the support of the equilibrium bid distribution is given by the
closed interval [0, v], agents who employ the invading strategy y will win the prize with
probability one whenever they are matched against an agent who employs the equilibrium
bidding strategy. In this case, the invading strategy y earns a higher expected payoff than
the equilibrium mixed strategy x, so the equilibrium mixed strategy for the all-pay auction
with three bidders and two prizes is not evolutionarily stable. A formal derivation of this
result is found in Appendix Section 4.2.1. Since mixed strategy Nash equilibrium fails to
induce a self enforcing convention in this all-pay auction, we expect to observe dynamic
instability in experimental bidding behavior.
2These settings include price competition [23], linguistics [59], and corporate investment [60].
62
As we expect this experimental environment to be rife with instability, we have
ample opportunity to examine the adaptive behavior of subjects. In particular, we will
specifically examine noisy optimization dynamics and a noisy imitation dynamics from
evolutionary game theory [8]. In these adaptive models, agents make asynchronous
strategy adjustments over time. The timing of these adjustments follows a homogeneous
Poisson process with a rate of δ adjustments per second. The value bit here denotes the
bid employed by agent i at time t. To determine the relative strengths of these models, we
also develop a multi-parameter model that nests each as a special case.
Under deterministic optimization models, such as those described by Gilboa and
Matsui [15] and Golman [61] agents switch precisely to their best response. In contrast,
the logit dynamic is a noisy optimization model [17, 62], predicting that agents will be
more likely to select bids that yield higher payoff. Under this model, the likelihood that an
agent i who adjusts her bid at time t will select a particular bid b is given by:
fi,t (b) =
exp (βpii (b, b−i,t))∫ w
0
exp (βpii (x, b−i,t)) dx
(3.6)
Purely imitative models [e.g., 61, 63, 64, 65] predict that agents will exclusively
imitate the strategies of other agents they encounter. Such models predict that agents
will never innovate by playing a strategy that was not previously employed by others in
the population. In an experiment such as this one, with a continuous strategy space and
finite number of subjects, this prediction will almost certainly fail as subjects pick new
strategies that were not previously employed by others. To increase the flexibility of these
imitative models, we consider a noisy imitation model under which agents are more likely
to select bids that are close to the bid that is currently employed by the agent with the
highest earnings rate. Let bHt denote the bid employed by the agent who has the highest
earning rate at time t. Under this noisy imitative model, the likelihood that an agent who
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adjusts her bid at time t will select a particular bid b is given by:
fi,t (b) =
exp
(
γ
∣∣b− bHt ∣∣)∫ w
0
exp (γ |x− bHt |) dx
. (3.7)
It is important to note that the noiseless imitate-the-best dynamic is a special case of
this model where γ →∞.
To examine the relative strength of the noisy imitation and optimization dynamics, we
develop a combined model that includes each both imitation and optimization as a special
case. In this combined model, the attraction of a bid x for an agent i at time t is given by
Ait (b) = αpii (b, b−i,t)− β |b− bi,t| − γ
∣∣b− bHt ∣∣ . (3.8)
Here bit denotes the bid employed by agent i at time t and bt
H denotes the bid employed by 
the agent who is earning the highest payoff at time t. The parameter α denotes the extent 
to which agents are more likely to select strategies that yield higher payoffs. The 
parameter β denotes the degree to which bids are autocorrelated, that is, the extent to 
which agents tend to select bids that are close to their previous bids.3 The parameter γ 
captures denotes the tendency to imitate success, that is, the extent to which agents tend to 
pick bids which are close to the bid employed by the highest earning player. Accordingly, 
the likelihood that agent i will select a bid x when she makes an adjustment at time t is 
given by
fit (b) =
exp (Ait (b))∫ w
0
exp (Ait (x)) dx
. (3.9)
3Results show the removal of this autocorrelation term does not affect the relative explanatory power of
the imitative or logit terms (see Table 3.3).
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3.3 Experimental Design and Procedures
3.3.1 Design
To implement the game discussed in Section 3.2, subjects were endowed withw = $10
and competed for prizes with value v = $7. Subject bids were bounded on the interval
[0, w]. As this game takes place in continuous time, each session consisted of one
continuous 40 minute period. During this period, subjects could adjust their bids as
frequently as desired with the click of the mouse. Whenever a subject clicked, her bid
instantaneously changed to the level corresponding to the horizontal position of her mouse,
and the corresponding payoff rates were immediately recalculated.
The experiment consisted of two informational treatments. Under the global informa-
tion treatment, each subject received real-time information regarding the bids and payoffs
of every participant in her cohort. Under the local information treatment, subjects only
observed their own bid and payoff. In both treatments, bids and payoffs were recorded at
a rate of four times per second.
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 illustrate the experimental interface under the local-information
and global-information treatments, respectively. The subject’s current bid and payoff is
represented by a blue line. The horizontal position of the blue line indicates the subject’s
current bid and the height of the blue line indicates the subject’s current payoff. The
subject’s current bid and payoff are displayed numerically at the bottom of the screen.
Under the global-information treatment, the current bid and payoff of each other subject
is represented by a red line.
To provide random rematching in continuous time, we employ a mean matching
protocol [e.g. 20, 21]. Each subject’s instantaneous payoff is given by the expected value
of her payoff from being randomly matched into a group of three agents. By the law of
large numbers, high frequency mean-matching provides a superior approximation to truly
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Figure 3.2: User Interface Under Local Information
Figure 3.3: User Interface Under Global Information
66
continuous random matching than does high frequency random matching.
3.3.2 Procedures
Thirty subjects participated in one session of the global-information treatment and
27 subjects participated in one session of the local-information treatment. Subjects were
recruited from the Texas A&M undergraduate population using an ORSEE database [66].
All sessions were run in the Texas A&M Economic Research Laboratory using z-Tree
[67].
At the end of every session, each subject received the time average of their instanta-
neous payoff plus a five dollar show-up payment. Subject earnings averaged $15.20 in
the global-information treatment and $16.09 in the local-information treatment, including
the five dollar show-up payment. In equilibrium, average subject earnings would equal
$15.00, so subjects received slightly above equilibrium earnings under both treatments.
All sessions lasted less than one hour.
3.4 Hypotheses
The game utilized in our experiment is not evolutionary stable, so adaptive models
predict persistent disequilibrium rather than convergence to equilibrium. Figure 3.4 shows
a heat map illustrating the changes in the predicted distribution of bidding behavior over
time in our experiment for a population of 30 simulated agents. We employ the adaptive
dynamics in equation 3.8 where α = 3, β = 0.3, and γ = 0.3. In contrast to the
static predictions of Nash and Quantal Response Equilibrium model (see section 3.2.1),
the adaptive model predicts persistent bidding cycles.4 This theoretical prediction results
in the following hypothesis.
4The intuition for bidding cycles is as follows. When bids are sufficiently low agents can benefit by
slightly outbidding their competitors, so competition gradually drives bids upwards. As bids gradually
increase towards the value of the prize, average profits decrease. When profits became sufficiently low,
agents can effectively opt-out of the auction by bidding close to zero, thus reinitializing the bidding cycle.
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Figure 3.4: Changes in the distribution of bidding behavior over time in a population
of 30 simulated agents under adaptive dynamics obtained from a nonparametric
conditional density estimator with a bid bandwidth of 0.5 and a time bandwidth of
0.3 seconds
Hypothesis 1. Subjects will exhibit persistent bidding cycles under both the local
information treatment and the social information treatment.
Throughout these disequilibrium cycles, adaptive models of imitation and optimization
predict very different behavioral dynamics. Figure 3.5 provides an example of the
predicted probability density of a new bid selected by player 1 at time t. The upper
figure illustrates the predicted density under noisy imitative models and the lower figure
illustrates the predicted density under noisy myopic optimization models. The horizontal
position of each vertical line indicates the current bid of one player and the height of the
line indicates the current payoff to this player. The shaded area under the curve indicates
the probability density for a new bid selected by player 1.
Under the bidding profile depicted in figure 3.5, player 2 is has the highest payoff with
bid b2, so noisy imitation models predict that player 1 is likely to imitate this successful
strategy by selecting a new bid that is close to b2. In contrast, noisy optimization models
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Figure 3.5: The predicted probability density of a new bid selected by player 1 at
time t. The top panel illustrates the predicted density under imitative models and the
lower panel illustrates the predicted density under myopic optimization models.
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predict that player 1 is only likely to select bids that are slightly higher than b2 as selecting
a bid slightly lower than b2 would not improve the payoff to player 1. This sharp contrast
between the theoretical predictions from imitation and optimization in this game is part of
what allows our experimental design to provide a uniquely powerful test of these adaptive
models.
Since our experimental design allows us to disentangle imitation from optimization
in observed subject behavior, we next ask how these models will perform under our
different information treatments. Adaptive imitation models place a strong informational
requirement on agents. As [68] notes, “imitation is a simple behavior that has two basic
ingredients. One needs to be able to observe what others have done and one needs to be
capable of doing what they have done.” Hence adaptive imitation models require agents to
observe the behavior of their peers. In contrast, adaptive optimization models describe
agents who attempt to directly maximize their own payoff, so adaptive optimization
models require agents only to observe their own payoffs.
Our local information treatment provides each subject with information regarding their
own bids and payoffs, so we hypothesize that noisy optimization behavior (depicted in the
lower panel of figure 3.5) will be observed in that treatment. In contrast, information
regarding the bids and payoff of others is only provided in our global information
treatment, so we hypothesize that noisy imitative behavior (depicted in the top panel of
figure 3.5) will be observed in that treatment. Moreover, our global information treatment
is designed to make implementing adaptive imitation as easy as possible; subjects only
need to click on the highest bar on a computer screen (see figure 3.3 for a depiction of
the interface) to implement adaptive imitation. In contrast, implementation of adaptive
optimization is more computationally demanding for subjects, since it requires them
to compute counterfactual payoffs from their information regarding the bids of others.
Accordingly, we hypothesize that
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Hypothesis 2. Imitative models will outperform optimization models in the social
information treatment, but not in the local information treatment.
Finally, a growing literature [e.g., 69, 70, 71, 72] suggests that the provision of social
information to economic agents helps agents to behave more rationally and come closer
to the predictions of traditional economic theory and those of Nash equilibrium. For this
reason, we speculate that the additional information provided by our social information
treatment may help subjects to learn their way out of disequilibrium cycles and behave
more consistently with the theoretical predictions of Nash equilibrium. This reasoning
leads to our final hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3. Behavior in the social information treatment will exhibit greater stability
and greater consistency with Nash equilibrium.
3.5 Results
Table 3.1 provides summary statistics for both the local information and global
information treatments and a comparison with the equilibrium predictions. Recall that
the Nash equilibrium of this game predicts that subjects will employ a mixed strategy with
bids distributed according to the probability density function described in Section 3.2.1.
On average, subjects in both of our treatments exhibit lower bidding than the equilibrium
prediction. Consequently, the average earnings in both treatments are higher than the
equilibrium prediction. In both treatments, we also observe instances of dominated
bidding—bids above 7—which are never predicted to occur in equilibrium. Consistent
with hypothesis 1, we do not observe a convergence to equilibrium in either treatment; the
last 10 minutes of the experiment are not noticeably closer to equilibrium play than the first
10 minutes of the experiment. In general, there are only minor differences between the first
and last 10 minutes of the experiment. Of those differences that exist (e.g., average bid
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Private Information Global Information
Equilibrium
Prediction
initial 10
minutes
last 10
minutes overall
initial 10
minutes
last 10
minutes overall
mean bid 3.73 3.54 3.57 4.57 4.31 4.47 4.67
bids above 7a 1.95% 0.45% 1.22% 5.57% 4.58% 6.96% 0.00%
minimum bidsb 1.63% 3.77% 3.03% 0.72% 0.81% 0.90% 0.00%c
mean earnings 10.94 11.13 11.11 10.20 10.36 10.21 10.00
a. In this game, bids above 7 are always dominated by bidding 0.
b. The minimum bid is 0.
c. A bid of 0 is in the support of the mixed equilibrium strategy. However, the predicted occurrence of such
bids by the equilibrium model is 0, because the strategy space is continuous.
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics for Bids and Earnings in Local Information Treatment,
Global Information Treatment, and Equilibrium Predictions. The treatment statistics
include groupings by the first 10 minutes and last 10 minutes to provide more detail about
initial and final play.
decreasing, earnings increasing), most are moving away, rather than toward, equilibrium
predictions.
Result 8. Both average payoffs and average bids differ significantly across treatments.
i. Subjects bids are higher and closer to the Nash equilibrium predictions in the global-
information treatment.
ii. Payoffs in the global-information treatment are lower and closer to equilibrium than
those in the local-information treatment.
Bids in the global-information treatment are significantly higher than those in the
local information treatment. Table 3.1 shows that the mean bid in the global information
treatment is $0.90 higher than the mean bid in the local information treatment, so the
former is closer to the equilibrium prediction. Subjects in the global information treatment
are also more likely to select dominated bids above 7 and less likely to make 0 bids than
those in the local information treatment. Figure 3.6 provides nonparametric estimates
of the aggregate bid density under each treatment, showing that bids in the global
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Figure 3.6: Empirical Bid Distributions. The density function is estimated using the
local constant kernel density estimator of [1] and [2] with a normal kernel and a bandwidth
of 0.5.
information treatment are generally larger than those in the local information treatment.
A non-parametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov test finds the empirical bid distributions to be
significantly different (p < 0.01).
Figure 3.6 illustrates nonparametric estimates of the aggregate bid density under each
treatment alongside the symmetric Nash equilibrium density function. As Table 3.1
implies, both of the observed bid distributions are generally lower than the equilibrium
distribution, but with longer right tails. A non-parametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov test finds
both empirically observed bid-distributions to be significantly different from the Nash
equilibrium distribution (p < 0.01). Moreover, neither bid distribution is consistent
with logit quantal response equilibrium. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test finds both the
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Figure 3.7: Empirical Expected Payoff Functions under Alternate Treatments. The
expected payoff function is estimated using the local constant kernel regerssion estimator
of [3] and [4] with a normal kernel and a bandwidth of 0.5
local-information-treatment bid distribution and the global-information-treatment bid
distribution to be significantly different from their corresponding maximum-likelihood
logit quantal response equilibrium predictions (p < 0.01; local information: η = 0.792,
global information: η = 0.505).
Payoffs also differ significantly across treatments. Table 3.1 shows that mean payoffs
in the local information treatment are $0.90 higher than the global information treatment.
Subjects in the global information treatment earned an average of $15.21 while subjects in
the local information treatment, subjects earned an average of $16.11; significantly higher
earnings at the one percent level. A non-parametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov test finds the
empirical payoff distributions to be significantly different (p < 0.01).
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In equilibrium, every bid between zero and the value of the prize should yield the same
expected payoff since rational agents must be indifferent between pure strategies over
which they mix. Figure 3.7 shows that both treatments violate this indifference property.
However, this violation is much more severe in the local information treatment than in the
global information treatment, suggesting that subjects in the global information treatment
are more precisely maximizing their payoffs. A non-parametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test finds both empirically observed earnings distributions to be significantly different
from the Nash equilibrium distribution (p < 0.01). Similarly, the empirical earnings
distributions are also inconsistent with quantal response equilibrium. A Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test finds both the local-information-treatment earnings distribution and the
global-information-treatment earnings distribution to be significantly different from their
corresponding maximum-likelihood, quantal response equilibrium predictions (p < 0.01;
local information: η = 0.792, global information: η = 0.505).
Result 9. Throughout the 40 minute session, subject behavior in both treatments is
characterized by a state of disequilibrium, resembling neither the Nash-equilibrium nor
the logit quantal response equilibrium. There is no convergence to equilibrium; rather
behavior in both treatments is characterized by persistent cycling.
Consistent with hypothesis 1, the bidding behavior observed in each treatment is
characterized by persistent, identifiable, disequilibrium cycling. Figures 3.8 and 3.9
illustrate “heat maps” for the same periods as Figures 3.10(a-f). Moreover, note that the
observed cycles in bidding behavior are consistent with the theoretical predictions from
adaptive models illustrated by figure 3.4. In contrast to Hypothesis 3, these cycles are
more rapid in the global-information treatment than in the local information treatment, so
bidding behavior is actually less stable under the presence of social information.
One quantitative way to analyze the observed bidding behavior is to examine the time
series of the mean bid employed by subjects. Figures 3.10(a-c) illustrate the dynamics of
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the average bid in the global information treatment for the first, middle, and last minute,
respectively, of the session. There is also a strong cyclical pattern to the mean bid in
all three phases. Figures 3.10(d-f) provide the dynamics of the average bid in the local
information treatment for the first, middle, and last minute, respectively, of the session.
If subjects employ an equilibrium mixed strategy, then future changes in the mean bid
should be uncorrelated with past changes in the mean bid. To test this hypothesis, we
conduct the Ljung–Box test on the differenced time series of the mean bid. We find that
the Ljung–Box test rejects the null hypothesis of uncorrelated changes in the mean bid
at the one percent level under both treatments, suggesting that subjects exhibit significant
disequilibrium dynamics in both treatments.
Result 10. Observed bidding dynamics differ significantly across treatments.
i. Bidding cycles have higher frequency in the global information treatment than in
local information treatment.
ii. Bidding dynamics under the global information treatment exhibit far less behavioral
noise than under the local information treatment.
The cycles observed in the aggregate bid data also differ across treatments. Figures
3.8 and 3.9 in the global information treatment are characterized by frequent cycles that
appear to be about 5 seconds in length. The cycles are more noisy in Figures 3.10 (b,d,f)
in the local information treatment and the distance from the peak of one cycle to the next
can be as large as 20 seconds. The heat maps in Figures 3.8 and 3.9 also confirm these
results. While cyclical patterns repeat about every 5 seconds in the global information
treatment, they repeat about every 20-40 seconds in the private information treatment.
Consistent with these results, the maximum likelihood estimates reported below indicate
greater precision and less autocorrelation in the global information treatment, suggesting
that the underlying adaptive processes are significantly different across treatments.
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Figure 3.8: Changes in the empirical distribution of bids over time under global
information obtained from a nonparametric conditional density estimator with a bid
bandwidth of 0.5 and a time bandwidth of 0.3 seconds. Figures (a-c) depict the global
information treatment for the first, median, and last minute, respectively.
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Figure 3.9: Changes in the empirical distribution of bids over time under local
information obtained from a nonparametric conditional density estimator with a bid
bandwidth of 0.5 and a time bandwidth of 0.3 seconds. Figures (a-c) depict the local
information treatment for the first, median, and last minute, respectively.
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Figure 3.10: Movement of the average bid in the first (top row), median (middle row),
and last (bottom row) minutes of the global and local information treatments. Figures
(a, c, e) (left) show the global information treatment. Figures (b, d, f) (right) show the local
information treatment.
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Global Information Local Information
Optimization Imitation Optimization Imitation
precision parameter (β)
1.54
(0.15)
0.60
(0.07)
0.68
(0.05)
0.33
(0.12)
observations 32634 32634 27225 27225
total log-likelihood -58808.48 -66379.35 -57155.04 -58812.47
Table 3.2: Maximum-Likelihood Models of Noisy optimization and Imitation Dynam-
ics, Global-Information and Local-Information Treatments. The noisy optimzation
model outperforms the noisy imitation-response model. Both models perform better in the
global information treatment than in the local information treatment. All parameters are
significant at the 1% level. Standard errors are obtained via subject clustered bootstrap
estimation.
Result 11. Behavior in both treatments is far more consistent with optimization than
imitation.
It is useful to examine which factors best explain bidding behavior in the observed
data. To that end, we estimate adaptive models of both noisy optimization and noisy
imitation (see Section 3.2.2 for a full description of these models). Each model provides
a continuous probability distribution that gives the likelihood fit(b) that a given bid b will
be selected by a subject i at time t, based on a single precision parameter β (see equations
3.6 and 3.7 and figure 3.5 for more details). For a given β, the total likelihood for each of
these models is the product of all observed fi,t(bi,t). The β∗ that maximizes this likelihood
function is the maximum likelihood precision parameter. Table 3.2 provides results for
both models under both treatments of the experiment.
There is a clear ranking of these single parameter models in terms of how they explain
the data. In contrast to hypothesis 2, optimization dynamics are a better predictor of
disequilibrium subject behavior than noisy imitation dynamics under both treatments.
Both models have more explanatory power in the global information treatment than in
local information treatment, which is consistent with our finding of greater behavioral
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noise in the local-information treatment than the global-information treatment (see Result
10 for details).
After examining simple one-parameter models separately, it is desirable to combine the
noisy optimization, and noisy imitation models in a combined model. We also consider
models that include an autocorrelation term accounting for the tendency of subjects to
select new bids close to their previous bid. This term is especially relevant in the local
information treatment where subjects are unable to observe the bids of others, and hence,
tend to employ a trial and error strategy.5
Table 3.3 provides parameter estimates for the combined model in the local-information
and global-information treatments. In the global-information treatment, subject bidding
behavior is primarily driven by payoff incentives following the noisy optimization dy-
namic. In addition, there is also some degree to which individuals tend to select bids close
to their own previously used bid. Under local information, bidding behavior is largely
driven by autocorrelation with previously selected bids, with the payoffs under the noisy
imitation dynamic as a secondary factor.
The difference in the explanatory power of the noisy optimization dynamic across
treatments is not surprising. Subjects have the ability to directly maximize their payoff
only when they have information regarding the bids employed by others. Thus, in the
global-information treatment, they can directly respond to their payoff incentives. In
the local-information treatment, they only receive information about the payoff they earn
from the strategy they currently employ. Without further information about the strategies
employed by others, subjects cannot easily determine how their payoff would change
if they were to adjust their strategy. In this case, it makes sense that subjects would
5To make this point more salient, if the bid autocorrelation term were part of our one-parameter model
comparison in Table 3.2, it would provide the greatest explanatory power in the local-information treatment.
In the global information treatment, it would still outperform the imitative response model, but not the
optimization response model.
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Global Information Local Information
logit (α)
(payoffs)
1.37
(0.11)
1.48
(0.14)
0.56
(0.07)
0.48
(0.05)
previous bids (β)
(subject specific) -
0.56
(0.07) -
1.39
(0.11)
imitation response (γ)
(the highest earning bid)
0.12
(0.03)
0.07
(0.03)
0.10
(0.02)
0.08
(0.02)
observations 32634 32634 27225 27225
log-likelihood -58345.36 -49805.06 -56954.91 -33030.53
mean log-likelihood -1.79 -1.52 -2.09 -1.21
typical bid likelihood 0.17 0.22 0.12 0.30
Table 3.3: Multiple-Parameter Models of Bidding Dynamics. A multi-parameter model
including terms for logit and imitative dynamics is estimated on both the local and global
information treatments. An additional specification includes a term for the tendency of
subjects to make bids close to their previous bids. All parameters are significant at the 1%
level. Standard errors are obtained via subject clustered bootstrap estimation.
experiment by making trial adjustments and then return to the strategies that provided the
highest payoffs. This trial-and-error approach is consistent with the high autocorrelation
of current bids and previous bids in the local-information treatment and it also explains
how subjects are able to approximately best respond to their opponents’ strategies without
directly observing them.
Imitation explains very little of the observed behavior in either treatment. In the local
information treatment, subjects see neither the payoff nor the strategy of any subject other
than themselves, so the lack of imitation is unsurprising, since subjects can not directly
implement the imitative model. However, in the global-information treatment, subjects
need only to click on the highest bar to perfectly follow the imitative model, but the data
indicate that subjects use something more complex than a simple imitation heuristic; they
perform noisy myopic payoff optimization.
The autocorrelation in subject bids may explain why the imitative dynamic appeared
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to have some explanatory power in a one-parameter model. Since bids tend to bunch
together, as illustrated in Figure 3.8, the autocorrelation with a subject’s own previous bid
produces similar predictions to imitation of the bids employed by others. Consequently, a
simple one-parameter imitation model with no autocorrelation parameter can misidentify
autocorrelation in a subject’s own bids for imitation of others. Results from the combined
model presented in Table 3.3 suggest that much of the explanatory power attributed to
imitation under the global informaton treatment actually results from autocorrelation with
a subjects own previous bid.
3.6 Conclusion
This study experimentally investigates dynamic bidding behavior in continuous-time,
all-pay auctions. In contrast to previous experimental studies of the all-pay auction,
our subjects earned continuous flow payoffs and could adjust their bids asynchronously
throughout the experiment. By permitting this type of asynchronous adjustment, we
obtain a remarkably fine-grained picture of the empirical bidding behavior, allowing a
close examination of behavioral bidding dynamics.
Consistent with theoretical predictions from adaptive models, but in contrast with both
Nash and quantal response equilibrium predictions, subjects in our experiment exhibited
persistent cyclical bidding behavior. This sustained disequilibrium behavior, along with
the markedly discontinuous nature of payoff functions in the all-pay auction, allows
us to closely investigate the predictive power of imitative and optimization dynamics.
Surprisingly, behavior in the global-information treatment, which provides each subject
with the information to easily employ imitative dynamics, is characterized by increased
precision of optimization behavior but very little imitative behavior, resulting in higher
bids, lower payoffs, and more rapid behavioral cycles.
Our results suggest a general failure of imitative models to adequately describe
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human cognition in strategic settings. Subjects in the global information treatment could
easily imitate the highest performing subject by selecting the highest line on a computer
screen. However, instead of merely imitating successful strategies, subjects followed more
sophisticated optimization methods, responding to the structure of their payoff incentives.
In the local-information treatment, subjects do not have the necessary information to
imitate other subjects. In the absence of social information, subjects employ trial-and-
error strategies, selecting strategies near those that gave them higher payoffs. Subjects
in the global information treatment compete more vigorously, their bidding cycles are
far more rapid, and they exhibit far less behavioral noise. As a result, both average
bids and average earnings are significantly closer to equilibrium predictions in the global
information treatment than in the local information treatment.
While this experiment is primarily concerned with testing theoretical predictions, it
also provides some interesting policy implications. In particular, these results suggest
that policy makers may want to promote the distribution of social information in strategic
environments where effort expenditure has positive externalities, such as patent races or
competition for research grants. In contrast, policy makers may want to discourage the
distribution of social information in strategic environments where effort expenditure is
wasteful or has negative externalities, such as political lobbying or international warfare.
Naturally, further research will be needed to verify the extent to which these experimental
results carry over to other strategic environments.
3.7 Mathematical Appendix
3.7.1 Nash Equilibrium Derivation
Consider the following auction with three bidders and two prizes. Each player starts
with an endowment w selects her bid from the closed interval [0, w]. After all three bids
have been selected, the top two bidders each receive a prize with value v < w. However,
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every player must pay her bid, regardless of whether or not she won a prize. In the case of
a tie, the remaining prizes are randomly assigned among the tying players. Accordingly,
the payoff function for player i is given by:
pii (si, sj, sk) =

w − si + v if si > min {sj, sk}
w − si + 2v/3 if si = sj = sk
w − si + v/2 if si = min {sj, sk} < max {sj, sk}
w − si otherwise
Suppose that there exists a continuous symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium
with support over the closed interval [0, v]. Let F (z) = P (bj < z) denote the
corresponding cumulative distribution function. Let Wi denote the event that bidder i
wins and receives and item. Let Li denote the event that bidder i loses and does not
receive and item. If bidder j and bidder k follow this Nash equilibrium mixed strategy,
then the probability that bidder i loses the auction is given by:
P (Li) = P (bi < bj and bi < bk)
= P (bi < bj)P (bi < bk) = P (bi < bj)
2
= [1− P (bj < bi)]2 = [1− F (bi)]2
= 1− 2F (bi) + F (bi)2
Now the probability that bidder i wins the auction is given by:
P (Wi) = 1− P (Li)
= 1− [1− 2F (bi) + F (bi)2]
= 2F (bi)− F (bi)2
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Hence bidder i’s expected payoff, conditional on her bid, is given by:
pii (bi) = w + vP (Wi)− bi
= w + v
[
2F (bi)− F (bi)2
]− bi
= w + 2vF (bi)− vF (bi)2 − bi
If the mixed strategy F is a best response for agent i, then she must be indifferent
between all of the bids in the support of F . Hence all of the bids in the closed interval
[0, v] must yield the same expected payoff for bidder i. Moreover, since bidding zero will
certainly yield an expected payoff of zero, every bid between zero and v must yield an
expected payoff of zero. Accordingly, we can write:
pii (bi) = 0 for all bi ∈ [0, v]
2vF (bi)− vF (bi)2 − bi = 0
−bi = −2vF (bi) + vF (bi)2
−bi
v
= −2F (bi) + F (bi)2
1− bi
v
= 1− 2F (bi) + F (bi)2√
1− bi
v
= 1− F (bi)
F (bi) = 1−
√
1− bi
v
for all bi ∈ [0, v]
Differentiating this cumulative distribution function obtains the Nash equilibrium
probability density function:
f (bi) =
1
2v
(
1− bi
v
)−1/2
for all bi ∈ [0, v]
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3.7.2 Logit Quantal Response Equilibrium Derivation
Consider the following auction with three bidders and two prizes. Each player starts
with an endowment w selects her bid from the closed interval [0, w]. After all three bids
have been selected, the top two bidders each receive a prize with value v < w. However,
every player must pay her bid, regardless of whether or not she won a prize. In the case of
a tie, the remaining prizes are randomly assigned among the tying players. Accordingly,
the payoff function for player i is given by:
pii (si, sj, sk) =

w − si + v if si > min {sj, sk}
w − si + 2v/3 if si = sj = sk
w − si + v/2 if si = min {sj, sk} < max {sj, sk}
w − si otherwise
Suppose that there exists a continuous symmetric logit quantal response equilibrium
with support over the closed interval [0, w]. Let F (z) = P (bj < z) denote the
corresponding cumulative distribution function. LetWi denote the event that bidder i wins
and receives and item. Let Li denote the event that bidder i loses and does not receive and
item. If bidder j and bidder k follow this mixed strategy, then the probability that bidder i
loses the auction is given by:
P (Li) = P (bi < bj and bi < bk)
= P (bi < bj)P (bi < bk) = P (bi < bj)
2
= [1− P (bj < bi)]2 = [1− F (bi)]2
= 1− 2F (bi) + F (bi)2
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Accordingly, the probability that bidder i wins the auction is given by:
P (Wi) = 1− P (Li)
= 1− [1− 2F (bi) + F (bi)2]
= 2F (bi)− F (bi)2
Hence bidder i’s expected payoff, conditional on her bid, is given by:
pii (bi) = w + vP (Wi)− bi
= w + v
[
2F (bi)− F (bi)2
]− bi
= w + 2vF (bi)− vF (bi)2 − bi
Under a logit quantal response equilibrium, agents do not always select their best
response, but they are more likely to select bids that yield higher payoffs. Here the level of
behavioral noise is indexed by the parameter η. As η approaches infinity, the logit quantal
response equilibrium approaches uniformly random behavior. As η approaches zero, the
logit quantal response equilibrium approximates a Nash equilibrium. Formally, we can
write:
f (b) =
exp (ηpii (b))∫ w
0
exp (ηpii (x)) dx
f (b) =
exp
(
η
(
2vF (b)− vF (b)2 − b))
C0
C0f (b) = exp
(
2ηvF (b)− ηvF (b)2 − ηb)
C0
dF
db
= exp
(
2ηvF (b)− ηvF (b)2 − ηb)
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Integrating both sides of this differential equation obtains
C0
∫
exp
(
ηvF 2 − 2ηvF) dF = exp (−ηb) db
ηC0
∫
exp
(
ηvF 2 − 2ηvF) dF = 1
η
− 1
η
exp (−ηb)
C1 exp (ηv)
∫
exp
(
ηv (F − 1)2) dF = 1
η
− 1
η
exp (−ηb)∫
exp
(
ηv(F − 1)2) dF = C3 − C4 exp (−ηb)
error function by introducing the function G (x) =
We can solve for the cumulative distribution ∫function F in terms of the imaginaryx
0
exp (u2) du =
√
pi
2
erfi (x).
G (
√
ηv (F − 1)) = C3 − C4 exp (−ηb)
√
ηv (F − 1) = G−1 (C3 − C4 exp (−ηb))
F − 1 = 1√
ηv
G−1 (C3 − C4 exp (−ηb))
F (b) = 1− 1√
ηv
G−1 (C3 − C4 exp (−ηb))
Now since bids are restricted to be non-negative, we have
F (0) = 0
1− 1√
ηv
G−1 (C3 − C4 exp (0)) = 0
1√
ηv
G−1 (C3 − C4) = 1
G−1 (C3 − C4) = √ηv
C3 − C4 = G (√ηv)
C3 = C4 +G (
√
ηv)
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Similarly, since bids cannot exceed the endowment w, we have
F (w) = 1
1− 1√
ηv
G−1 (C3 − C4 exp (−ηw)) = 1
1√
ηv
G−1 (C3 − C4 exp (−ηw)) = 0
G−1 (C3 − C4 exp (−ηw)) = 0
C3 − C4 exp (−ηw) = G (0) = 0
C4 +G (
√
ηv)− C4 exp (−ηw) = 0 since C3 = C4 +G (√ηv)
G (
√
ηv) = C4(exp (−ηw)− 1)
C4 =
G
(√
ηv
)
exp (−ηw)− 1
We can use these solutions for C3 and C4 to obtain a closed form solution for the
cumulative distribution function F
F (b) = 1− 1√
ηv
G−1 (C3 − C4 exp (−ηb))
F (b) = 1− 1√
ηv
G−1 (C4 +G (
√
ηv)− C4 exp (−ηb)) since C3 = C4 +G (√ηv)
F (b) = 1− 1√
ηv
G−1
(
G (
√
ηv)
[
1− 1− exp (−ηb)
1− exp (−ηw)
])
since C4 =
G
(√
ηv
)
exp (−ηw)− 1
Differentiating the cumulative distribution function F obtains the corresponding
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probability density function
f (b) = F ′ (b) = − 1√
ηv
∂
∂b
[
G−1
(
G (
√
ηv)
[
1− 1− exp (−ηb)
1− exp (−ηw)
])]
f (b) = − 1√
ηv
∂
∂b
[
G−1 (H(b))
]
f (b) = − 1√
ηv
∂G−1(H(b))
∂H(b)
H ′(b)
f (b) = − 1√
ηv
G′(G−1(H(b)))−1H ′(b)
f (b) = − 1√
ηv
exp(G−1(H(b))2)−1H ′(b) since G′ (x) = exp
(
x2
)
f (b) = − 1√
ηv
exp(−G−1(H(b))2)H ′(b)
f (b) = − 1√
ηv
exp(−G−1(H(b))2)H ′(b)
f (b) =
ηG
(√
ηv
)
exp (−ηb)√
ηv [1− exp (−ηw)] exp(−G
−1(H(b))2) since H ′(b) = −ηG
(√
ηv
)
exp (−ηb)
[1− exp (−ηw)]
f (b) =
ηG
(√
ηv
)
exp (−ηb)√
ηv [1− exp (−ηw)] exp
(
−G−1
(
G (
√
ηv)
[
1− 1− exp (−ηb)
1− exp (−ηw)
])2)
3.7.3 Evolutionary Instability of the Nash Equilibrium
Intuitively, a strategy is evolutionarily stable if it induces a self-enforcing convention.
In other words, a strategy x is evolutionarily stable if no other strategy y can invade it
when the entire population initially employs strategy x. More formally, in a in a symmetric
normal form game, a strategy x is evolutionarily stable if there exists someC ∈ (0, 1) such
that for all ε ∈ (0, C) and for any other strategy y
pi ( x | y + (1− )x ) > pi ( y | y + (1− )x ) (3.10)
Thus, if x is evolutionarily stable and a sufficiently small proportion of the population
deviates to an alternate strategy y, then agents who employ x will earn a strictly higher
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payoff than agents who employ y.
The Nash equilibrium strategy for the all-pay auction is not evolutionarily stable. To
see why, suppose that a small proportion  of the population deviates from the Nash
equilibrium strategy x to an alternate strategy y under which agents always bid the full
value of the prize. Since the support of the equilibrium bid distribution is given by the
closed interval [0, v], agents who employ the invading strategy y will win the prize with
probability one whenever they are matched against an agent who employs the equilibrium
bidding strategy. So the expected payoff to an agent who deviates to strategy y is given by
pi ( y | εy + (1− ε)x ) = ε2pi1 (y, y, y) + 2ε (1− ε) pi1 (y, y, x) + (1− ε)2 pi1 (y, x, x)
pi ( y | εy + (1− ε)x ) = ε2pi1 (y, y, y) since pi (y, y, x) = pi1 (y, x, x) = 0
pi ( y | εy + (1− ε)x ) = −ε
2v
3
since pi1 (y, y, y) = −v
3
On the other hand, the expected payoff to an agent who employs the equilibrium mixed
strategy is given by
pi ( x | εy + (1− ε)x ) = ε2pi1 (x, y, y) + 2ε (1− ε) pi1 (x, y, x) + (1− ε)2 pi1 (x, x, x)
pi ( x | εy + (1− ε)x ) = ε2pi1 (x, y, y) + 2ε (1− ε) pi1 (x, y, x) since pi1 (x, x, x) = 0
pi ( x | εy + (1− ε)x ) < −ε2pi1 (x, y, y) since pi1 (x, y, x) < 0
pi ( x | εy + (1− ε)x ) < −ε2E{bid|x} since pi1 (x, y, y) = −E{bid|x}
pi ( x | εy + (1− ε)x ) < −2ε
2v
3
since E{bid|x} = 2v
3
pi ( x | εy + (1− ε)x ) < pi1
(
y, (εy + (1− ε)x)2) since − 2ε2v
3
< −ε
2v
3
Thus the invading strategy y earns a higher expected payoff than the equilibrium mixed
strategy x, so the equilibrium mixed strategy for the all-pay auction with three bidders and
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two prizes is not evolutionarily stable. Hence the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium does
not induce a self enforcing convention in this all-pay auction. Accordingly, we expect to
observe dynamic instability in experimental bidding behavior.
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